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Abstract 
 
In recent years, a review of the Judicature Act and the introduction of the Judicature 
Modernisation Bill have enlivened the debate over the structure and character of the New 
Zealand court system. A key issue that the recent review and reforms have brought to the 
fore is whether greater judicial specialisation is advantageous at the High Court level. This 
paper considers whether tax cases, in particular, warrant greater judicial specialisation. The 
paper draws from experiences of specialised tax adjudication in foreign jurisdictions and 
evaluates the efficacy of existing specialisation in the New Zealand system, as well as 
considering whether the nature of tax law lends itself to specialisation. The conclusion is 
that greater judicial specialisation in respect of tax cases is undesirable. Admittedly, 
specialisation has been effective in many foreign jurisdictions and many characteristics of 
tax law favour specialisation. Yet, specialisation would come at a price in terms of the 
independence of tax judges and the development of idiosyncratic law. Moreover, New 
Zealand’s size would decimate the benefits that it could gain from further specialisation, 
particularly when the disputes process and the Taxation Review Authority already 
incorporate an effective level of specialisation to the resolution of tax disputes in New 
Zealand.  
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Introduction 
 
Modern society is incredibly specialised. This reaches across most 
professions; doctors may specialise in a microscopic facet of anatomy, 
engineers and manufacturers may exclusively produce tiny parts of 5 
machinery, and lawyers may solely practise in obscure areas of law. Within 
these professions, the advances and expertise that specialists achieve often 
means that the benefits of specialisation are axiomatic and undoubted. Yet, 
since its inception as a generalist bench, the New Zealand judiciary has 
remained remarkably resistant to this trend towards specialisation. It may be 10 
that this signals a failing of the judiciary to adapt to more complex divisions 
of labour, or perhaps judging simply remains an area in which the price of 
specialisation is more pronounced. It is often said that “taxes are the price 
we pay for a civilised society”,1 but this paper asks: what is the price that we 
pay for an increasingly specialised society, as regards judicial specialisation 15 
for New Zealand tax law cases?  
Across the New Zealand legal system, dissatisfaction with the 
ordinary courts has led to an influx in demand for specialist courts and judges. 
A survey by the New Zealand Bar Association indicated that 84 per cent of 
members supported judicial specialisation.2 Prominent members of the legal 20 
community have spoken out in favour of judicial specialisation,3 including 
Tony Molloy QC,4 James Farmer QC,5 and Attorney-General Chris 
Finlayson.6 In response to the growing pressure for specialisation, the past 
few decades have seen an ad-hoc and reactionary proliferation of tribunals 
and specialised adjudicators,7 reflecting a perception that decision-making 25 
must be increasingly specialised to serve the interests of justice. Nonetheless, 
judicial specialisation has attracted opposition from a large number of 
judges,8 including Chief Justice Sian Elias.9 The Law Commission’s 
                                               
1 This quote is most often attributed to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. as originating from 
his dissenting judgment in Compañia General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of 
Internal Revenue 275 US 87 (1927) at 100.  
2 The New Zealand Bar Association “Submission to the Law Commission on the Review of 
the Judicature Act 1908” as cited in Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: 
Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC R126, 2012) at 104. 
3 Phil Taylor “Justice in the Firing Line” The New Zealand Herald (online ed, Auckland, 5 
May 2012). 
4 Tony Molloy “New Zealand: Cuckoos in the Nest in an Otherwise Promising Trust and 
Investment Jurisdiction” Offshore Investment (New Zealand, November 2009). 
5 James Farmer “The High Court in Review” (8 October 2012) JAMES FARMER Q.C. 
<www.jamesfarmerqc.co.nz>. 
6 Christopher Finlayson, Attorney-General of New Zealand “Access to Justice, Legal 
Representation and the Rule of Law” (speech to the Legal Research Foundation, 23 October 
2009). 
7 Law Commission Striking the Balance (NZLCPP51, 2002) at 78-90; Law Commission 
Tribunals in New Zealand (NZLC IP6, 2008) at appendix 1. 
8 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a New Courts Act (NZLC 
R126, 2012) at 103. 
9 Rod Vaughan “Twitchy lawyers put heat under Chief Justice” The National Business 
Review (online ed, New Zealand, 23 August 2012); Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper 
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comprehensive review of the Judicature Act 190810 and the introduction of 
the Judicature Modernisation Bill,11 which implements the Commission’s 
recommendations, have reinvigorated the ongoing debate over judicial 
specialisation in the High Court. 
Tax law is frequently singled out as a prime candidate for greater 5 
specialisation12 and judicial tax specialisation has developed in many foreign 
jurisdictions, raising the question of whether New Zealand ought to follow in 
this development. New Zealand invests a great deal into the management of 
its income tax system and the far-reaching effects of taxation affect all 
citizens.13 When tax disputes arise, a functioning system for the adjudication 10 
of tax law disputes is essential to the operation of New Zealand’s economy.14 
The introduction of specialist judges, courts, or panels stands to have a 
significant effect on the process and results of the court system. Accordingly, 
it is necessary to consider the merits of specialisation in a principled manner, 
particularly when the benefits of specialisation tend to be more readily 15 
apparent than its consequences.  
This paper will address whether increased adjudicative tax 
specialisation is desirable in New Zealand, considering the “price” we pay for 
judicial specialisation, as well as its benefits. The paper is divided into four 
parts. Part I will consider judicial specialisation generally and observe the 20 
often-unprincipled trend towards specialisation in New Zealand. Part II will 
evaluate the level of judicial specialisation in New Zealand in respect of tax 
law, with particular reference to the position of the Taxation Review 
Authority, concluding that problems with tax specialisation in New Zealand 
are best addressed by reform to existing means of specialisation rather than 25 
overlaying additional judicial specialisation. Part III will survey a selection 
of specialised overseas jurisdictions to gain insights into the realities of 
judicial specialisation and to establish whether New Zealand should follow 
the example that they have set. Lastly, Part IV will apply a set of normative 
criteria to determine whether the nature of tax law is suitable for greater 30 
judicial specialisation.  
                                               
‘Government response to the Law Commission’s report "Review of the Judicature Act 1908: 
Towards a New Courts Act’” (April 2013) at [16]. 
10 Law Commission, above n 8.  
11 Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013. 
12 The Law Commission has recommended the establishment of specialist panels in taxation, 
intellectual property, competition, and admiralty law: Law Commission Delivering Justice 
for All: A Vision for New Zealand Courts and Tribunals (NZLC R85, 2004) at 267. 
13 In the 2012-2013 financial year, the Inland Revenue Department collected some $53.8 
billion in tax revenue and had an operating budget of $684.9 million: Annual Report 2013 
(Inland Revenue, Annual Report B-23, October 2013). 
14 Ivor Richardson “Directions for Tax Administration: Two Recent Reports” (1994) 22 FL 
Rev 461 at 461.  
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I.   Surveying Specialisation in New Zealand 
i. A “General” History of Specialisation 
Historically, New Zealand’s court system has been characterised by a 
preference for generalist judges. More recently, there has been a growing 
trend towards specialisation, which is particularly evident in the growth of 5 
tribunals. 
New Zealand established its first court, the Supreme Court, in 1841 as 
a general court. The New Zealand court system indicated an early inclination 
towards judicial generalism; the Supreme Court streamlined the common law 
and equity jurisdictions, simplified the procedural rules of its English 10 
model,15 and specified that its jurisdiction incorporated testamentary, lunacy, 
vice-admiralty and criminal jurisdiction.16 These generalist origins are 
attributable to the small size of the judiciary at the time, which necessitated 
that the few judges covered a vast range of cases.17 The introduction of the 
lower courts in 1841 brought greater speciality to the court system, with 15 
courts such as the Court of Requests and the Court of Petty Sessions.18 In 
1858, the first District Courts replaced these two specialised courts,19 
returning to New Zealand’s leaning towards courts of a wide jurisdiction. 
The advent of specialist courts happened gradually with the 
establishment of the predecessors to the modern Maori Land Court and Maori 20 
Appellate Court in 1865,20 the Employment Court in 1894,21 and the 
Environment Court in 1953.22 The scattered introduction of these specialised 
courts indicates the absence of an underlying rationale or cohesive vision for 
the New Zealand court system.  
In 1968, New Zealand took a considerable leap towards judicial 25 
specialisation with the introduction of the Administrative Division of the 
High Court. The short-lived Division was abolished in 1991, following Law 
                                               
15 Supreme Court Ordinance 1841; see also Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 
1908: Towards a Consolidated Courts Act (NZLC IP29, 2012) at 110. 
16 Supreme Court Ordinance 1841, Ordinance 1, Session 2; Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn, and 
Richard Boast A New Zealand Legal History (2nd ed, Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2001) at 
203. 
17 G A Wood “Construction and Reform: The establishment of the New Zealand Supreme 
Court” (1968) 5 VUWLR 1 at 3. 
18 The Court of Requests dealt with the recovery of small debts and the Court of Petty 
Sessions allowed justices of the peace to resolve certain criminal law cases: Philip A Joseph 
and Thomas Joseph. “Judicial system - History of the courts” (3 July 2012 Te Ara - the 
Encyclopedia of New Zealand) <www.TeAra.govt.nz>.  
19 Peter Spiller, Jeremy Finn, and Richard Boast, above n 16, at 204. 
20 First established in 1865 under Native Lands Act 1865, s 5 as the Native land Court. Now 
established in the Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993 (Maori Land Act 1993), s 6; Te Ture 
Whenua Maori Act 1993 (Maori Land Act 1993), s 50. 
21 The Court can be traced to the Court of Arbitration established under the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act 1894. It is now under the Employment Relations Act 2000, 
s187. 
22 The Court first existed as an Appeal Board under the Town and Country Planning Act 
1953, then became a Planning Tribunal under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The 
Resource Management Amendment Act 1996, s 6 introduced the modern Environment Court. 
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Commission recommendations.23 Amongst the reasons for the division’s 
demise was a caseload that “lacked the critical mass needed for successful 
specialty”24 and a growing interest and expertise of High Court judges in 
public law as it became more common, dissolving the need for specialist 
judges. 5 
 Fig. 1: Specialisation in the New Zealand Court Hierarchy25 
 
More recently, there has been a proliferation of tribunals dealing with 
specialist matters.26 Once introduced, these tribunals have proved resistant to 
“overhaul and rationalisation”.27 Despite repeated attempts by the Law 10 
Commission to streamline the tribunal system, New Zealand still has well 
over 100 disparate tribunals.28 The Commission has remarked that the 
tribunals “have grown in ad hoc and random fashion. They have been set up 
to meet specific needs, but not according to any rational pattern”.29 
Specialist courts, too, have developed in an ad hoc manner, and it is 15 
not always clear why specialisation was considered necessary for particular 
areas of law over others.30 The creators of specialist courts often acted with 
little forethought as to the courts’ operation as part of the general court 
structure.31 Instead, the establishment of new specialist courts was motivated 
by a response to an immediate, pragmatic, and identified need, 32 or by an 20 
                                               
23 Law Commission The Structure of the Courts (NZLC R7, 1989). 
24 Law Commission Seeking Solutions: Options for Change to the New Zealand Court System 
(NZLC PP52, 2002) at 157. 
25 This diagram is reproduced from: “Diagram of the Courts Structure” Courts of New 
Zealand <www.courtsofnz.govt.nz>. 
26 Law Commission Striking the Balance, above n 7, at 78-90; Law Commission Tribunals 
in New Zealand, above n 7, at appendix 1; See also W John Hopkins “Order from Chaos? 
Tribunal Law Reform in New Zealand” (2009) 1 JIA Law TA 47. 
27 Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, at 6. 
28 Trevor Daya-Winterbottom “Specialist Courts and Tribunals” (2004) 12 Waikato L Rev 
21 at 22. 
29 Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, at 6. 
30 Law Commission Striking the Balance, above n 7, at 50; See also the comments of Roger 
Kerr, who states that “I believe there are good arguments for abolishing most of them 
[existing specialist courts]”: Roger Kerr "Judging the Judiciary” (paper presented to 
Wellington District Law Society Conference, Ruapehu, June 1998) at 8. 
31 The same cannot be said for the introduction of the Administrative Division, which 
followed the “PALRC Report”: Appeals from Administrative Tribunals (Public and 
Adminsitrative Law Reform Committee of New Zealand, First Report, 1968).  
32 Daya-Winterbottom, above n 28, at 24.  
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attempt to privilege a particular area or influence the decisions within that 
area. For instance, the Native Land Court was introduced to expeditiously 
further the native land policies of the time. The Act’s preamble asserted that 
the Court’s purpose of achieving the policy of converting title, without 
consideration of the principles behind specialisation or its consequences on 5 
the wider court system.33 Similarly, the first Arbitration Court (now the 
Employment Court) was established by William Reeves, who described the 
Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act as his “pet measure”.34 Reeves 
was a socialist and sought to have disputes settled outside of the general legal 
system that were connected to what he described as “the natural warfare 10 
between classes”.35 The Employment Court’s history again seems to be borne 
out of a specific desire to introduce a specialisation, without regard for the 
implications on the cohesion of the court system. Baum observes that: 36 
Most often, proposals for specialized courts have been adopted because 
advocates and decision makers sought to shape the substance of judicial 15 
policy… The perceived virtues of specialization as such have played 
only a limited part in the adoption of particular proposals. 
Robertson agrees, concluding:37 
Specialist Courts are created when some interest group does not believe 
that equal application of the laws by judges applying the traditional 20 
canons of statutory interpretation and the traditional values of the 
common law will result in decisions that favour its own ideology and 
interests.  
Going forward, proposals for judicial specialisation must be carefully considered 
to prevent deference to interest groups with an interest in influencing judicial 25 
policies and decisions, which has plagued the history of specialist courts in New 
Zealand. 
ii. Means of Specialisation 
Specialisation may be internal, through the creation of divisions within the 
general court system, such as for the Youth Court and the Family Court, or it 30 
may be external, such as for the creation of the separate Environment Court.38 
This distinction is not always conclusive as to the degree of judicial separation 
of the particular court; Environment Court judges are also District Court 
judges even though the court is separate, whereas Employment Court and 
                                               
33 The Native Lands Act 1865, preamble. 
34 Keith Sinclair William Pember Reeves: New Zealand Fabian (Clarendon Press, 1965) at 
151. 
35 Keith Sinclair “William Pember Reves” in Dictionary of New Zealand Biography: Volume 
Two, 1870-1900 (Bridget Williams Books: Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1993) 
at 413.  
36 Lawrence Baum Specializing the Courts (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2011) at 
214. 
37 Bernard Robertson “The Status and Jurisdiction of the New Zealand Employment Court” 
(paper presented to the New Zealand Business Roundtable, Wellington, August 1996). 
38 Susan Glazebrook “A Specialist Patent or Intellectual Property Court for New Zealand?” 
(2009) 12 JWIP 524 at 525. 
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Maori Land Court judges sit separately.39 Panel systems and specialist lists 
may also act as an inroad to the judiciary’s general nature. For instance, the 
commercial list in the High Court adds a greater degree of specialisation.40 
Different means of specialisation strike a different balance between 
generalisation and specialisation.  5 
Specialisation can take place at any level of the judicial system. It is 
most likely to have the greatest impact at the High Court level,41 leaving 
appellate judges to benefit from the expertise of the judge who first pieced 
together the facts of the case in the lower court, when this expertise is often 
touted as the primary justification for specialisation.  10 
This paper will consider two main methods of specialisation; a tax 
court or a tax panel. A specialist tax court would sit at High Court level and 
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear tax cases. A panel would be composed of 
a list of High Court judges who have particular tax expertise. Tax cases would 
be allocated to judges on the panel and panel judges would continue to hear 15 
other High Court cases.  
 
II. Judicial Specialisation in Respect of Tax Law 
i. What is Tax Law? 
It is necessary to demarcate what tax law is before considering whether it 20 
demands greater judicial specialisation because an inability to define a 
discrete area of law can stand as an initial obstacle to specialisation. For 
instance, Frankel has questioned whether commercial specialisation is 
appropriate, noting the overlap where “commercial law may involve 
contractual matters of either a generalist or a specialist nature (such as 25 
construction contracts), insolvency matters, tax issues, property matters, 
intellectual property matters…”.42 Tax law is less burdened by this problem 
than many other legal disciplines.43 Tax cases are easily identified through 
the presence of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue Department (IRD) as a 
party. Tax cases typically deal with assessments of tax decisions or 30 
determinations of the Commissioner that are authorised by the various 
Income Taxation Acts. The simple identification of tax law means that it is 
                                               
39 Law Commission, above n 12, at 16.  
40 The Commercial list was established in 1987. The list provides a pre-trial procedure for 
certain commercial cases, but returns cases to the High Court to be allocated to any High 
Court judge. Although the list was initially successful, nowadays only a small fraction of 
commercial cases is commenced by the commercial list: See generally Law Commission, 
above n 12, at 267-269. 
41 See S H Legomsky Specialized Justice - Courts, Administrative Tribunals and a Cross-
National Theory of Specialization (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1990) at 9. 
42 Susy Frankel “Facilitating and Regulating Commerce: Commentary on the Conference 
Session ‘Regulating and Facilitating Commerce’” in David Carter and Matthew Palmer (eds) 
Roles and Perspectives in the Law: Essays in Honour of Sir Ivor Richardson (Victoria 
University Press, Wellington, 2002) 391 at 394.  
43 But see the discussion of the “Degree of Isolation” of tax law in part IV.   
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less likely to be affected by jurisdictional conflicts, which can introduce 
second order litigation over which court ought to hear a particular case. 
ii. Current New Zealand Tax Judicial Specialisation 
Presently, there is no formal mechanism that provides for tax disputes to be 
dealt with by specialist judges in the general New Zealand court hierarchy. 5 
However, the disputes process and the Taxation Review Authority (TRA) give 
tax cases exposure to specialist practitioners and judges. An analysis of these 
forums reveals that the New Zealand tax system already incorporates a 
significant degree of specialisation in the valuable early stages of a tax 
dispute. While the process has some shortcomings, reforms to elements of the 10 
existing process are more likely to be effective than superimposing an extra 
layer of specialisation to the court system. 
 
  Fig. 1: New Zealand Tax Disputes Structure 
iii. Taxation Review Authority 15 
a. Overview of the TRA 
Taxation was possibly the first area of British law to develop a recognisable 
tribunal, with the establishment of a board of three commissioners under the 
1799 Income Tax Act.44 New Zealand followed this model, establishing a 
Board of Review in 1891,45 although New Zealand has adopted several 20 
different adjudicative bodies for tax disputes since then.46 The TRA provides 
an important initial opportunity for prospective litigants to have their cases 
heard by a specialist judge. Following the disputes process, litigants may file 
proceedings with the Authority. The Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994 
provides for the establishment of 1 or more Taxation Review Authorities.47 25 
Technically, the Authority need not be a judge. Section 5(3) provides that an 
                                               
44 The Duties upon Income Act 1799. See also Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, 
above n 7, at 13. 
45 Land and Income Assessment Act 1891, s 20. 
46 See generally, Law Commission Tribunals in New Zealand, above n 7, at 16. 
47 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 5.  
12 
 
experienced lawyer of not less than seven years’ practice may also act as the 
Authority. In practice, this has not occurred. Since 2012, a single District 
Court Judge has acted as the Authority, Judge AA Sinclair.48  
The Governor-General appoints judges to the Authority on the 
recommendation of the Minister of Justice.49 The tenure of an appointment is 5 
for a term not exceeding seven years.50 Authorities may be reappointed, 
which has occurred frequently, with Judge Barber serving for some 31 years 
in 1981-2012.51 The TRA’s appointment process is different to the usual 
appointment of judges in New Zealand,52 whereby the Governor-General 
appoints judges on the Attorney-General’s advice.53 The divergence in 10 
appointment practice is troubling, because the ministerial involvement 
introduces a political dimension to judicial appointments. In view of the 
Government’s substantial interest in the funding it receives from taxation, it 
seems inappropriate to give the Minister power over the appointment of a 
specialist Authority. The Law Commission has recommended the 15 
introduction of consistent appointment guidelines for tribunals, but suggested 
that the Minister of Justice, as a supposedly “disinterested party”, be 
responsible for tribunal appointments.54 The government did not implement 
the recommendation, but a 2014 cabinet paper proposes that the Ministry of 
Justice publish the tribunal appointment and reappointment process where it 20 
is common across tribunals.55 This proposal may boost the transparency of 
TRA appointments. 
The limited tenure of a judge is another inroad into judicial 
independence and gives a member of the executive the power to appoint new 
judges after an arbitrary period if the Authority reaches decisions that conflict 25 
with governmental interests. Although the need for judicial independence is 
intensified in respect of tax law, granting lifetime tenure to Authorities is not 
without problems too. If a single judge was granted lifetime tenure and 
developed a track record favouring the Commissioner, many taxpayers would 
be left without recourse. The Courts and Tribunals Enhancements cabinet 30 
paper proposes to amend the appointment term of an Authority to a term not 
                                               
48 “Appointment of a Taxation Review Authority” (7 June 2012) 66 New Zealand Gazette 
1820 at 1820. 
49 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 5(4). 
50 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 6(1). The Governor-General has the power to 
suspend or remove an Authority for engaging in an outside occupation, being unable to 
perform the functions of the office, becoming bankrupt, neglecting their duty, or for 
misconduct; Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 6(3). 
51 See Appendix 2 for a table of previous Authorities. 
52 However, this position is not unique for a tribunal such as the Taxation Review Authority. 
Unlike the courts, many tribunals have different advising ministers.  
53 See generally Phillip A. Joseph “Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges in New 
Zealand” in H. P. Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011). 
54 Law Commission Tribunal Reform (NZLC SP20, 2008) at 13.  
55 See Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper “Courts and Tribunals Enhancements” (24 
June 2014) at 5-6. 
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exceeding five years.56 Apart from Judge Sinclair’s five-year appointment in 
2012, a seven-year term has been standard for Authorities. This reduction 
may jeopardise the TRA’s independence, which is particularly crucial in light 
of the relationship between the state and the taxpayer, or it may prevent long-
term appropriation and wrecked credibility of the Authority.  5 
The Authority is technically an administrative tribunal, but in practice, 
it acts like any court of first instance. Indeed, some foreign commentators 
have classified the Authority as a specialist tax court.57 Under s 138P(1) of 
the Tax Administration Act 1994, the Authority is empowered to review 
assessments, including the power to confirm, cancel or vary an assessment, 10 
or to reduce the amount of an assessment. Taxpayers can generally file 
proceedings with the TRA or the High Court58 and there are powers to have 
the case transferred from the TRA to the High Court.59 Litigants usually have 
appeal rights to the High Court if the amount of tax involved exceeds $2000 
or the net loss exceeds $4000.60 Appeal may be granted to the Court of Appeal 15 
in some circumstances.61 A specialist tax court at High Court level would 
remove any potential strategic advantage that taxpayers have in choosing 
between the TRA and the High Court, which presents an initial argument for 
specialisation.62  
b. Declining Cases: A Failure of Judicial Specialisation? 20 
Fig. 2: Number of TRA Decisions by Year63 
                                               
56 Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper, above n 55, at 5. 
57 Suzette Chapple “Income Tax Dispute Resolution: Can We Learn From Other 
Jurisdictions” (1999) 2(5) JAT 312 at 322. President North described the former Board of 
Review as a “judicial body” in Reckitt & Colman (New Zealand) Ltd v Taxation Board of 
Review [1966] NZLR 1032 at 1037. The Court of Appeal held that the Authority was a “court 
of inferior jurisdiction” for the purposes of s 67 of the Judicature Act in Jacobs v 
Commissioner of Inland Revenue [2012] NZCA 30. 
58 Carin Holmes and Kevin Holmes “Judicial System of New Zealand: Legal Remedies in 
the New Zealand Tax System” (2010) 16 Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin 63 at 65. 
59 Tax Administration Act 1994, s 138N. 
60 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 26. 
61 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, ss 24 (4), 26, 28.  
62 The Treasury identified this “tactical opportunity for taxpayers” as an issue in its discussion 
of a specialist tax court but did not find it persuasive: Tax Review 2001 (Treasury, Issues 
Paper, 2001) at 24. 
63 The number of tax cases is no longer collected by the Inland Revenue Department. These 
statistics are based on the number of cases reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases (NZTC). 
For a full table of the figures, see appendix 1. 
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The Authority has experienced a great decline in cases. A joint submission of 
the Law Society and the National Tax Committee of the New Zealand 
Institute of Chartered Accountants compares the 64 cases taken to the 
Authority in 1996 to the 13 cases that it had dwindled to in 2006.64 A single 
judge, for whom the Authority’s cases only take up approximately a quarter 5 
of her time, now deals with the work performed by four judges for whom 
Authority work occupied 80 per cent of their time in 1996.65 The small claims 
jurisdiction of the Authority was removed in 2011,66 after having been used 
less than 10 times since it was introduced.67 A decrease in sitting days also 
lends some empirical support to the deteriorating role of the Authority.68 As 10 
figure 3 demonstrates, the High Court still deals with the bulk of tax cases. 
The falling-off in cases to the Authority risks weakening the benefits of 
specialisation; without a steady stream of cases for judges to build expertise, 
the benefits of specialisation may wane. More critically, it may be that this 
decline signals a taxpayer preference to have cases heard before generalist 15 
judges. 
  
Fig. 3: Annual Tax Cases by Court69 
                                               
64 The New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 
“Joint Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the Taxation (Tax 
Administration and Remedial Matters) Bill” at 7-10 as cited in Andrew Maples “Resolving 
Small Tax Disputes in New Zealand – Is There A Better Way?” (2011) 6(1) JIA Law TA 96 
at 98.  
65 However, Judge Barber notes there were really only two active Taxation Review Judges, 
even when more district court judges held warrants for the Authority. Judge Barber 
commented that tax cases took up around 80 per cent of his time in 1988, with the other 20 
per cent dedicated to other criminal and civil court work: Ann Riley and others “International 
Conference Courts with Income Tax Jurisdiction: Conference Transcript” (1988) 8 Va Tax 
Rev 443 at 445.   
66 The small claims jurisdiction was removed by the Tax Administration and Remedial 
Matters Act 2011.  
67 New Zealand Master Tax Guide (2013 edition, CCH New Zealand Limited, New Zealand, 
2013) at 209. 
68 However, the small period for which sitting days were published and the significant effect 
that a handful of complex cases can have in skewing this data means that its usefulness is 
reduced: See appendix 3. 
69 The Inland Revenue Department no longer collects the number of tax cases. These statistics 
are based on the number of Authority decisions reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases 
(NZTC), and High Court cases on the Ministry of Justice’s searchable database of Judicial 
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However, it is not entirely fair to evaluate the TRA’s effectiveness through a 
case volume comparison with the High Court. The High Court holds powers 
that the Authority does not, such being vested with the sole power to hear 
judicial reviews and more extensive powers to award costs to the successful 5 
party (although this may be advantageous to some litigants).70 Another key 
difference is that TRA hearings are conducted privately and published 
anonymously.71 The High Court may also be the sensible route for taxpayers 
who expect to appeal their case further. The Treasury’s 2001 Tax Review 
was reluctant to force commencement at the Authority because it would 10 
increase legal costs and lengthen queues, when “many cases currently being 
initiated at the High Court are likely to be appealed from the Authority if 
initiated there”.72 Furthermore, institutional features of the courts such as the 
time and cost of hearings, which are not necessarily a direct reflection of 
success of specialisation, are suggested as being the dividing factors between 15 
the High Court and the Authority.73  
Compared to the large amounts of money at stake, the difference in 
the fees at the High Court and the TRA is insignificant,74 although the TRA may 
waive the filing fee where the disputant cannot pay the fee or the proceeding 
concerns a matter of genuine public interest that the taxpayer would not 20 
commence without the waiver.75 If the Authority cannot offer significantly 
less costly dispute resolution, then it is unlikely that High Court level 
specialisation would deliver this.  
Alternatively, the High Court may be preferred as a more expeditious 
avenue of dispute resolution. TRA decisions seem to take an excessive amount 25 
of time. The average age of cases from Ministry receipt to TRA decision is 
828 days,76 excluding 16 adjourned cases that obscure the true average age. 
The cabinet paper outlining these figures makes special mention of the fact 
that the “tribunal considers very complex and litigious cases, often relating to 
large companies”.77 However, information provided in August 2014 by the 30 
office of Hon Chester Borrows, Minister for Courts, indicates that work is 
                                               
Decisions Online. For a full table of the figures and explanation of the sources, see Appendix 
5. 
70 Compare section 51G of the Judicature Act 1908 and part 14 of the High Court Rules with 
sections 22 and 22B of the Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994.  
71 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 16(4); Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 
1998, reg 36(2). 
72 Tax Review 2001 (Treasury, Final Report, October 2001) at 2.21. 
73 For instance, see The New Zealand Law Society and the New Zealand Institute of 
Chartered Accountants “Joint Submission to the Finance and Expenditure Committee on the 
Taxation (Tax Administration and Remedial Matters) Bill” at 7-10. 
74 The application fee to have a case heard by the Taxation Review Authority is $410: 
Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998, reg 10(1). The application fee to have a case 
heard by the High Court is $1,350 and there are further hearing fees, depending on how many 
court days the matter takes: High Court Fees Regulations 2013, schedule 1. 
75 Taxation Review Authorities Regulations 1998, reg 10A. 
76 Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper, above n 55, appendix 1. 
77 Cabinet Social Policy Committee Paper, above n 55, at 19, n 1.  
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underway to deliver prompter resolution of tax disputes. The office aims to 
halve the time taken to deal with matters across the court and tribunal system 
by 2017, including those matters at the TRA.78 The Ministry is delivering this 
goal on policy and operational levels. The Minister is preparing the Courts 
and Tribunals Enhanced Services (CATES) Bill, which is expected to be 5 
released toward the end of 2014.79 Operationally, the TRA is “focusing in 
particular on older cases, ensuring the smarter management of tribunals 
support and judicial resources, and working alongside judicial officers to pro-
actively manage cases towards a resolution and reduce the time it takes to 
release reserved judgments”.80 This has produced encouraging results. 10 
Between 30 April 2013 and 24 August 2014, the average (mean) age of active 
cases at the Authority has decreased by 19.7 per cent, from taking 1756 days 
to 1410 days.81 Additionally, the number of cases in hand has decreased by 
66.8 per cent, from 157 cases to 52.82 If the unpopularity of the judicially 
specialised Authority is due to excessive delays, then this progress signals 15 
that legislative and operational changes at the level of the Authority are 
effective solutions, without the need to specialise the general court system. It 
also suggests that the Authority’s supposed failings are not as a result of its 
specialist nature or the problems associated with that, but more general 
operational issues. 20 
Indeed, beyond a quantitative assessment of the TRA, it is difficult to 
draw firm conclusions as to the qualitative success of tax specialisation in 
New Zealand based on the Authority’s record of accomplishment. Sir Ivor 
Richardson concludes:83 
I have read hundreds of Taxation Review Authority judgments and 25 
numerous High Court judgments too. I hesitate to generalise or to 
attempt any kind of ranking. Certainly I have found numerous 
judgements in both jurisdictions to be very helpful in the depth of the 
analysis and reasoning. 
While some judges have performed commendably,84 the performance of 30 
others is open to criticism. Some commentators have observed that Authority 
decisions are rarely appealed or reversed,85 although in some cases this may 
be symptomatic of unduly brief judgments that do not provide scope to 
appeal. There have been some issues of inconsistency both within the 
                                               
78 Email from Oliver Searle (Office of Chester Borrows, Minister for Courts) to Sarah Miles 
regarding Taxation Review Authority Enhancements (29 August 2014). 
79 New Zealand Government “Further Improvements To Tribunals Announced” (press 
release, 24 June 2014). 
80 Email from Oliver Searle, above n 78. 
81 Email from Oliver Searle, above n 78. 
82 Email from Oliver Searle, above n 78. 
83 Ivor Richardson “Observations from the Bench” (address to the NZ Society of Accountants 
1994 Tax Conference, November 1994). 
84 Hansard records praise in the House for the performance of the Authorities: “…the role of 
the Taxation Review Authority… has been discharged manfully by officials and members of 
the authority for a number of years”: (9 November 2004) 621 NZPD 16775. 
85 Paul Stephan “Courts with Income Tax Jurisdiction: An International Comparison” (1988) 
8 Va Tax Rev 233 at 242; see also Riley and others, above n 65, at 477. 
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Authority, and between the Authority and the High Court.86 This could 
highlight the risk of leaving adjudication to a small pool of experts: poor 
decision-making is more concentrated and the quality and outcome of 
decisions is more patchy and inconsistent, both intra-tribunally and inter-
tribunally.  5 
Figure 2 demonstrates that the sharpest decline in cases before the 
Authority occurs after 1990, with cases peaking in 1984-1990. One 
explanation for this may be the appointment of less preferred judges to the 
Authority; with only one judge sitting as the Authority, it may seem probable 
that the Authority’s caseload decline can be ascribed to litigants avoiding a 10 
particular judge. However, the decline in workload is unlikely to be 
attributable to the appointment of certain judges. The caseload decline in the 
early 1990s does not correspond with a personnel change; Judges Barber, 
Bathgate, and Keane were authorities throughout both the peak and declining 
periods of the Authority.87 The drop also corresponds to an overall drop in tax 15 
cases across all the courts.88 More likely, the drop in cases corresponds with 
certain events in the history of taxation. For instance, the introduction of 
goods and services tax in 1986 introduced extra litigation, while a major 
reform of the disputes process and enactment of the self-assessment regime 
in 1994 and the settlements policy in 1995 reduced the number of cases 20 
proceeding to the Authority.89 Because changes in the volume of tax cases 
before the authority are more often brought about by changes to the law or 
reforms to the adjudication process, then in the dynamic subject of tax law, 
the need for a flexible and adaptable court system is underscored. Greater 
High Court level specialisation risks damaging this flexibility by rigidly 25 
fixing the number of High Court judges able to hear cases.  
iv. Disputes 
Before a tax dispute arrives before a judge, it will have already passed through 
the disputes resolution process, which gives cases early exposure to a range 
of tax specialists to ensure that issues are identified and that factual disputes 30 
                                               
86 See Susan Glazebrook “Revenue Law” (1993) 4 NZ Recent Law Review 180; see also 
David Dunbar’s criticism of Judge Barber’s decisions in certain income-splitting cases (even 
though it is acknowledged that Judge Barber “… is an extremely experienced Taxation 
Review Authority with over 20 years’ judicial experience”: David Dunbar “Judicial 
Techniques for Controlling the New Zealand General Anti-Avoidance Rule: The Scheme and 
Purpose Approach, from Challenge Corporation to Peterson” (2006) 12 NZJTLP 324 at 340. 
87 See Appendix 2 for a table of appointments to the Authority. 
88 Justice William Young tracks a similar decline in tax cases to the High Court in “Tax 
Disputes in New Zealand” (2009) 4(1) JATTA 1 at 8. 
89 Former Taxation Review Authority, Judge Barber, similarly observed how fluctuations in 
the nature of cases driven by legislative and policy changes can affect overall case volumes, 
commenting that  “I rather think that the claims by employees under the Fourth Schedule to 
the Income Tax Act 1976 have fallen off a little, as have farming loss cases, but as I mention 
below, the rental loss situation is a new problem area and there appears to be a greater 
proportion of investigation hearings than previously”: Paul Barber “Tax and the Courts” 
(paper presented to the 1984 Residential Taxation Seminar, Wellington, November 1984) at 
2. 
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are addressed early in the challenge process.90 The Review Unit is an 
“independent”91 branch within the IRD, staffed by qualified accountants and 
lawyers.92 At the end of the process, the Disputes Review Unit will deliver an 
adjudication report based on the papers, which can be helpful for prospective 
litigants in determining their litigation risks according to specialist opinions. 5 
Key reviews and amendments to the disputes process in 2003 and 2010 have 
helped to achieve its objectives.93 However, the disputes resolution process is 
not a complete substitute for litigation. Justice Glazebrook emphasises the 
important societal benefits that the disputes process lacks, observing: “Court 
judgments have precedential value and the court process itself can act as a 10 
check on executive power, something which is essential to the rule of law”.94  
In Brown’s survey of tax cases between 1 September 2011 and 31 
August 2012, he found that the number of substantive cases heard by either 
the authority or the courts was only 15, with 86.7% of those cases resulting 
in outright wins for the Commissioner.95 Brown suggests that the disputes 15 
process may be too expensive and time-consuming for many taxpayers, 
pressuring them to concede cases that might otherwise be upheld at court, or 
that commercial settlements may pull potentially successful cases from the 
court system.96 Again, direct reforms to the disputes process best address this 
concern, rather than overlaying judicial specialisation. Regardless of the 20 
speed at which specialist courts or panels can dispose of tax cases, this 
efficiency will not remedy delays before the case reaches court. Indeed, 
                                               
90 Holmes and Holmes, above n 58, at 64. The Review Unit also significantly limits the 
number of cases reaching the courts, with approximately one third of reviews in favour of 
the taxpayer: Zoë Prebble and John Prebble “New Zealand” in Karen Brown (ed) A 
Comparative Look at Regulation of Corporate Tax Avoidance (Springer, Netherlands, 2012) 
243 at 248. 
91 Justice Glazebrook notes that “While the Unit is a separate unit within the Office of the 
Chief Tax Counsel, it is still an internal administrative mechanism without the independence 
of the courts and without the public scrutiny of its decisions in terms of the open justice 
principle, which again is so fundamental to our system of justice (and indeed of parliamentary 
democracy generally)”: Susan Glazebrook “Taxation Disputes in New Zealand” (paper 
presented to Australasian Tax Teachers Association (ATTA) Conference, Auckland, January 
2013) at 17. 
92 New Zealand Master Tax Guide (2013 edition, CCH New Zealand Limited, New Zealand, 
2013) at 222; “Office of the Chief Tax Counsel (OCTC): Disputes Review Unit” (9 July 
2013) Inland Revenue Department <www.ird.govt.nz>. 
93 A review of the process described the objectives of the process as being  “to improve the 
quality and timeliness of assessments and to reduce the likelihood and grounds for subsequent 
litigation”: Disputes: A Review – An Officials’ Issues Paper (Inland Revenue Department 
and the Treasury, July 2010) at 1.4.; Resolving tax disputes: a Legislative Review (Inland 
Revenue Department, July 2003). Similarly, Commentary to the Taxation (Annual Rates, 
Venture Capital and Miscellaneous Provisions Bill) 2004 identifies that “The main objective 
of the disputes process is to have legislation and administrative practices which encourage 
disputes to be dealt with fairly, efficiently, and quickly before they get to court”: as cited in 
James Coleman and Eugen Trombitas “Disputes with the IRD” (New Zealand Law Society 
Seminar, March 2009).  
94 Glazebrook, above n 91, at 17. 
95 Brendan Brown “New Zealand Case Law Developments” (paper presented to the New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 2012 Tax Conference, October 2012). 
96 See also Mark Keating “New Zealand’s Tax Dispute Procedure — Time for a Change” 
(2008) 14(4) NZJTLP 425; Glazebrook, above n 91, at 11. 
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disputes process reforms are already underway. In 2011, the IRD made several 
changes to the disputes process aimed at improving its timeliness. The 
changes include an assurance of more focused notices of proposed 
adjustments and clarification of the taxpayer’s limited opportunity to opt out 
of the disputes process.97 IRD also set tighter internal deadlines and processes 5 
for monitoring deadlines.98 This goes some way to correcting the former 
position, which imposed numerous deadlines on the taxpayer throughout the 
process, without reciprocal obligations on the Department.99 A taxpayer who 
failed to meet the stipulated timeframes would be deemed to accept the IRD’s 
position,100 allowing the Department to drag out disputes before they even 10 
reached court while the taxpayer was required to meet strict deadlines. 
v. Settlements 
Settlement policies also explain the decline in cases to the Authority and High 
Court. Section 6A of the Tax Administration Act was introduced in 1995, 
allowing the commissioner to settle for less than “the highest net revenue that 15 
is practicable within the law” in some circumstances.101 Subsequent cases 
affirmed the Commissioner’s power to settle disputes on a commercial 
basis.102 It is arguable that the case decline does not signal a failed application 
of judicial specialisation, but reflects changes to disputes and settlements 
practices. The shortcomings of these specialised stages of the process are best 20 
addressed, and are currently being addressed, by targeted reforms aimed at 
the particular delay or problem. High Court specialisation cannot be 
contemplated without reference to existing, specialised, stages of the tax 
disputes process.  
                                               
97 Disputes Resolution Process Commenced by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Inland 
Revenue Department, SPS 11/05, November 2011) at [65]-[92] and [172] to [195]; Disputes 
Resolution Process Commenced by a Taxpayer (Inland Revenue Department, SPS 11/06, 
November 2011) at [34]-[141] and [203]-[230]. 
98 Disputes Resolution Process Commenced by the Commissioner of Inland Revenue (Inland 
Revenue Department, SPS 11/05, November 2011) at [93]-[97]; Disputes Resolution Process 
Commenced by a Taxpayer (Inland Revenue Department, SPS 11/06, November 2011) at 
[138]-[141]. 
99 Brown and McKay accept that the indicative timeframes are not unreasonable, even though 
they are more generous than the taxpayer timeframes, but they still find it problematic that 
“the timeframes are subject to extension and there are no consequences for the Commissioner 
in failing to adhere to them”: Brendan Brown and Mathew McKay “Managing Tax Audits, 
Investigations and Disputes” (paper presented to New Zealand Law Society Tax Conference 
2010, September 2010) at 149.  
100 For instance, s 89H of the Tax Administration Act 1994 deems the taxpayer to accept the 
Commissioner’s position if the taxpayer does not reject an adjustment contained in the notice 
of proposed adjustment within the given response period, unless certain exceptional 
circumstances can be made out according to section 89K. 
101 See generally Mark Keating “Settlement of Tax Disputes: A Step Backwards” (paper 
presented to New Zealand Law Society Tax Conference 2011, September 2011) at 32-37. 
102 Auckland Gas Co. Ltd v CIR [1999] 2 NZLR 409 at 417; Attorney-General v Steelfort 
Engineering Co. Ltd (1999) 1 NZCC 61,030 at 61,036. See also “Care and Management of 
the Taxes Covered by the Inland Revenue Acts” – Section 6A(2) and (3) of the Tax 
Administration Act 1994 (Inland Revenue Department, IS 10/07, 22 October 2010). 
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Overall, the TRA and Disputes/Settlements Processes offer taxpayers 
an effective level of specialisation in New Zealand that would not be 
enhanced by the introduction of a specialist court or judges. Problems 
identified with the independence, cost, and timeliness of these 
specialisations are not usually related to their specialisation per se, and are 5 
being addressed by a range of reforms led by the Minister for Courts, and 
internally at the IRD.  
vi. De Facto Specialisation and Appointments 
As well as specialisation at the IRD and the TRA, there is arguably a de facto 
practice of specialisation on the New Zealand bench. Certainly, a small 10 
handful of judges have been instrumental in the development of New 
Zealand’s tax law. McLeod claims, “It is generally accepted that Sir Ivor is a 
tax expert who has had more influence on tax law and practice than any other 
New Zealand Judge”.103 Butler has observed an allocation pattern in tax cases 
between 1999 and 2001, noting, “Sir Ivor Richardson, Justice Blanchard, 15 
Justice Gault, and the High Court judges Justices McGechan, Robertson, and 
Salmon heard more tax law cases than their colleagues”.104 There are dangers 
in relying on de facto specialisation; it does not perform as effectively as a 
transparent system for specialisation, without the benefits of organised 
professional development and absent of any safeguards in place to minimise 20 
the perception of bias, isolation, and idiosyncratic development of the law. 
More broadly, many newly appointed judges have backgrounds in 
commercial law, contrary to the perception that High Court judges 
disproportionately come from criminal law backgrounds.105 Of 20 
appointments from 1 July 2010, 14 were judges with experience in 25 
commercial law firms.106 Brown suggests that the appointment of Justice 
Glazebrook to the Supreme Court, who has considerable experience as a tax 
practitioner, is of “particular interest to tax practitioners”.107 The appointment 
of more judges with a broad commercial background is a valuable way of 
equipping the judiciary to deal with tax cases, without many of the 30 
consequences associated with full models of specialisation. Although there is 
no legislative requirement that the Attorney-General consider the diversity of 
                                               
103 Rob McLeod “Collecting Taxes” [2002] VUWLR 33 at 33; See also Geoff Harley 
“Reflections on Sir Ivor Richardson’s Career in Tax Cases” (2002) 8(2) NZJTLP 141. 
104 Petra Butler “The Assignment of Cases to Judges” (2003) 1 NZJPIL 83 at 91. 
105 For instance, Roger Kerr comments that judges come from a narrow range of backgrounds, 
commenting that “There is a… potential source of judicial talent that is under-used because 
the system is clearly loaded against this group. A procedure of consulting senior judges 
inevitably favours the litigators who appear before them. Left largely out of account are the 
transactional or commercial lawyers who arguably undertake the real development of our law 
by devising original solutions to new problems”: Roger Kerr "Judging the Judiciary” (paper 
presented to Wellington District Law Society Conference, Ruapehu, June 1998) at 5.  
106 Brown, above n 95, at 10. 
107 Brown, above n 95, at 10. 
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experience and backgrounds of candidates,108 this factor influences both the 
appointments process protocol109 and practice.110 A specialist tax court or 
panel might make it simpler and more transparent to appoint judges based on 
tax-specific experience, but in light of the High Court’s existing commercial 
strength, this benefit of specialisation is marginal.  5 
vii. Implications of a Commercial Panel 
The Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 may have significant implications for 
the level of tax judicial specialisation in New Zealand. Clause 18 of the Bill 
establishes a commercial panel in the High Court, to replace the commercial 
list. Although the Bill does not set out the types of cases that the commercial 10 
panel will deal with, it is unlikely to deal with tax cases. The Bill abolishes 
the existing commercial list,111 suggesting that the cases that the commercial 
panel will determine are likely to remain the same as those dealt with by the 
commercial list. The commercial list does not incorporate the management of 
tax cases.  15 
Clause 18(2) of the Bill empowers the Chief High Court Judge, in 
consultation with the Attorney-General and the Chief Justice, to establish 
other panels of High Court Judges. There has been no suggestion that a High 
Court tax panel is imminent and the Law Commission was not satisfied that 
any other panels were justified.112 However, the existence of this significant 20 
power to create panels is a further reason that a considered debate regarding 
tax specialisation is crucial. In light of the ad-hoc history of judicial 
specialisation in New Zealand and the divergent judicial views on 
specialisation, entrusting this power to a sole person may risk a proliferation 
of specialist panels at the High Court, fragmenting the general court system.  25 
 
                                               
108 But see s 94 of the Judicature Modernisation Bill 2003, which requires the Attorney-
General to publish information concerning judicial appointment processes.  
109 The Attorney-General has recognised that “legal ability”, which includes a “sound 
knowledge of the law and experience of its application”, is a criterion for High Court 
Appointment. The appointment protocol recognises a broad range of legal experience and 
does not suggest any requirement for the Attorney-General to consider what a candidate 
would bring to the overall diversity of experience of the bench. However, the Attorney-
General does request a curriculum vitae with a full work history, including a list of significant 
cases the applicant has appeared as counsel in, as well as general career highlights: 
Christopher Finlayson “High Court Judges Appointment Protocol” (April 2013) Ministry of 
Justice <www.justice.govt.nz>. 
110 Former Attorney-General, Margaret Wilson, stated from her experience that it was 
important, at least for the Supreme Court, to “reflect a diversity of legal experience”: 
Margaret Wilson “Appointing Judges the New Zealand Way” (2013) 21 Wai L Rev 41 at 47. 
The Law Commission has also recognised the need to maintain a “horses for courses” 
approach to appointments when it formulated a set of general principles for the Attorney-
General to consider in making appointments: Law Commission, above n 15, at 27.  
111 The Bill does not carry forward s 24A of the Judicature Act 1908, which establishes the 
commercial list.  
112 Law Commission, above n 8, at 12. 
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III.  The Overseas Experience of Specialisation 
This part will compare the approach of several foreign jurisdictions towards 
specialisation of the judiciary in respect of tax. Many of the jurisdictions 
compared in this section have dissimilar tax systems to New Zealand, and far 
larger federal court systems. Bearing in mind these limitations, America, 5 
Canada, and Australia have been chosen because they share a broad common 
law heritage and they provide different models of specialisation that New 
Zealand might learn from. 
Most countries of a comparable size to New Zealand do not have 
judicial specialisation for tax matters in the general courts, although many 10 
have tax tribunals.113 This international consistency with similarly sized 
countries suggests that New Zealand’s court system is striking the 
appropriate balance for tax judicial specialisation. Of the countries sampled 
that do incorporate specialisation into the general courts, such as Lebanon, 
Finland, and Slovakia, most do not have dedicated tax specialisation, but 15 
administrative courts or divisions. Although New Zealand’s now defunct 
Administrative Division only had a limited jurisdiction to hear certain sales 
tax cases,114 the division’s collapse indicates that a return to this system 
would be ill judged.  
i. United States of America 20 
Fig. 4: US Tax Disputes Structure 
 
In 1924, the United States congress created the Board of Tax Appeals, which 
evolved to what is now the Tax Court, with a change to that name in 1942.115 
The Tax Court has national jurisdiction to hear tax cases.116 The United States 25 
court system also features several specialised state courts that hear tax 
disputes in connection with state tax laws.117 The Office of Appeals is an 
                                               
113 See Appendix 4. 
114 Legomsky, above n 41, at 56. 
115 The name was again changed to the United States Tax Court by the Tax Reform Act 1969 
Pub L No 90-172 83 Stat 730 (1969). See generally Erwin Surrency History of the Federal 
Courts (Oceana Publications, New York, 1987) at 319-320. 
116 “About the Court” (25 May 2011) United States Tax Court < www.ustaxcourt.gov>.  
117 For example: Oregon Tax Court, Hawaii Tax Appeal Court, Indiana Tax Court, 
Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board, Minnesota Tax Court, New Jersey Tax Court. 
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independent body that taxpayers may have their case reviewed by before 
progressing to the Court.118 Appeals from the Tax Court go to the general 
United States Court of Appeals in the circuit where the taxpayer resides. The 
taxpayer has the choice of having the case heard in the Tax Court, the District 
Court, or the Claims Court. The Tax Court is comprised of 19 presidentially 5 
appointed judges,119 alongside several senior judges and special trial 
judges.120  
An obvious strength of the Tax Court is the high degree of expertise 
of its judges. Baum notes that it is “regular practice” for judges to be chosen 
to serve on the Tax Court because of their pre-existing expertise from 10 
specialising in tax law as a practitioner.121 The biographies of Tax Court 
judges certainly support this claim.122 Baum argues that this expertise is likely 
to produce better decisions and he points to studies that observe a higher rate 
of Court of Appeal reversals coming from the District Court than the Tax 
Court.123 However, it seems that the strength of the United States’ tax 15 
judiciary is largely a function of the size of the United States, rather than its 
approach to specialisation. The United States population and tax system is 
exponentially larger than New Zealand’s. In 2013, the United States Tax 
Court alone had 335 full-time employees and total budgetary resources of $48 
million.124 Judge Barber notes that the key difference between the United 20 
States Tax Court and the TRA is size, stating, “We are a very small operation 
by comparison”.125 The United States’ population of some 315 million people 
compared to New Zealand’s 4.5 million, suggests that the introduction of a 
specialist court or panel would probably have a marginal effect on the pool of 
judicial candidates, which will inevitably lack tax specialists in a small legal 25 
community. 
Despite the strength of the tax bench, the Tax Court has been criticised 
for its insularity and its lack of independence and transparency,126 suggesting 
that this criticism of specialist courts is almost unavoidable, regardless of how 
well executed or on what scale the specialisation is. Specialisation, by nature, 30 
tends to be tarnished by these problems of appropriation and insularity, even 
though extent of benefits from specialisation tends to vary proportionately to 
the scale of specialisation.  
                                               
118 “Appeals… Resolving Tax Disputes” (16 June 2014) Internal Revenue Service 
<www.irs.gov>.  
119 Presidential nomination is subject to Senate confirmation.  
120 “About the Court” (25 May 2011) United States Tax Court < www.ustaxcourt.gov>. 
121 Lawrence Baum “Probing the Effects of Judicial Specialization” (2009) 58 Duke LJ 1667 
at 1676. 
122 See “Judges” (11 April 2014) United States Tax Court < www.ustaxcourt.gov>. 
123 Baum, above n 36, at 153. 
124 Office of Management and Budget (US) (eds) Fiscal Year 2015 Appendix, Budget of the 
United States Government (Government Printing Office, United States, 2014) at 40. 
125 Riley and others, above n 65, at 474.  
126 Leandra Lederman “Tax Appeal: A Proposal to Make the United States Tax Court More 
Judicial” (2008) 85(6) Wash U L Rev 1195.  
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ii. Canada 
Fig. 5: Canadian Tax Disputes Structure 
 
Canada’s introduction of a specialist tax court is more recent. The Tax Court 
of Canada was established in 1983 as a superior federal court of record, 127 5 
replacing the Tax Review Board.128 The court has exclusive original 
jurisdiction to hear appeals or matters arising under certain statutes such as 
the Excise Tax Act and the Income Tax Act.129 The Governor in Council 
appoints judges.130 The Court currently consists of a Chief Justice, an 
Associate Chief Justice and 23 other judges.131 10 
The Court was established to fulfil the recommendations of a report 
by the Carter Commission, which criticised the independence and prestige 
of the former Tax Review Board.132 A specialist court was recommended to 
remove suggestions of political interference and to attract more skilled 
judges, who had begun to view the Tax Board as an inferior tribunal. The 15 
Tax Court’s mission statement reflects a balancing between the dangers and 
advantages of judicial specialisation, affirming a commitment to “providing 
the public with an accessible and efficient appeal process and working 
together to maintain a fair and independent Court".133 By most accounts, the 
Tax Court is balancing these competing aims effectively. The Court’s 20 
success is evident in the rejection of a 1997 proposal to consolidate the 
Federal Court and the Tax Court, with many stakeholders unprepared to 
surrender the efficiency that the specialised Court was providing.134 Overall, 
the Court receives glowing reports from most commentators, with 
                                               
127 Tax Court of Canada Act RSC 1985 c T-2, s 3. 
128 See Alban Garon and others “Tax Court of Canada: 20th Anniversary Symposium” (2005) 
53(1) Can TJ 135 at 137. 
129 Tax Court of Canada Act RSC 1985 c T-2, s 12. 
130 Tax Court of Canada Act RSC 1985 c T-2, s 4(2). 
131 “Judges” (10 June 2014) Tax Court of Canada <www.tcc-cci.gc.ca>. 
132 Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation (Queen’s Printer, 1967). 
133 Tax Court of Canada, 1999-2000 Estimates, Report on Plans and Priorities  
(Tax Court of Canada, 1999) at 6.  
134 Ian MacGregor and others “The Development of the Tax Court of Canada: Status, 
Jurisdiction, and Stature” (2010) 58 Can TJ 87 at 97. 
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MacGregor and others commenting that “The Court has garnered respect 
from both the general public and the tax community”.135 
iii. Australia 
Australia has no specialist tax court, but incorporates specialisation at the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) and in a list and panel system at the 5 
Federal Court.  
  Fig. 6: Australian Tax Disputes Structure 
 
The taxpayer can take a dispute to the AAT or the Small Taxation Claims 
Tribunal (STCT) within the AAT if the claim is for less than $5,000.136 10 
Taxpayers may then appeal to the Federal Court to be heard by a single 
judge, with a further right of appeal to have the full Federal Court hear the 
case. The final opportunity for appeal is by special leave to the High Court. 
Interestingly, Australia does not have a sophisticated disputes process before 
the AAT as New Zealand has before the TRA. Commentators have questioned 15 
this gap and suggested that Australia ought to follow New Zealand’s practice 
in this area.137 
The AAT was established in 1976, replacing the former Board of 
Review, which was a board with three members: a person from the tax office, 
an accountant, and a lawyer. The Tribunal has been criticised for perpetuating 20 
a pro-administration leaning that developed from the Tax Office’s influence 
in appointments to the Board of Review.138 Australia’s experience reinforces 
                                               
135 MacGregor and others, above n 134, at 98.  
136 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 24AC.  
137 Chapple, above n 57, at 322. 
138 Hugh Ault and Brian Arnold Comparative Income Taxation: A Structural Analysis 
(Kluwer Law International, 1997) at 19. See also Wayne Gumley “The Taxation Appeals 
System: An Administrative Law Perspective” in Chis Evans and Abe Greenbaum (eds) Tax 
Administration: Facing the Challenges of the Future (Prospect Media, St Leonards (NSW), 
1998) 299 at 307-308: “The basis for this change was a perception by tax practitioners that 
the presence of former ATO employees as chairpersons undermined the independence of the 
Boards. A related argument was that the relatively small number of Board members (some 
of whom were also former ATO officers) created a risk that they would become attuned 
favourably to arguments regularly presented by ATO advocates before the Board”.  
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that the development of a perception of bias to a specialist body is not a 
fanciful prospect and that it can have devastating consequences for the 
reputation of the court or tribunal. This lends support to an argument for 
transferring the TRA appointment powers of the Minister of Justice (as 
advising minister) to an apolitical office, such as the Attorney-General. 5 
Notwithstanding these suggestions of political influence, Justice Downes has 
praised the Taxation Appeals division for its strong membership, asserting, 
“The Tribunal… began its taxation jurisdiction with a distinguished group of 
taxation specialists. That position has continued throughout its 25 year 
history”.139 However, if a much larger country such as Australia struggles to 10 
appoint judges whose experience in private firms or government departments 
does not give rise to perceptions of bias, then New Zealand is sure to struggle 
to improve on this experience.  
The Governor-General appoints members of the AAT as a President, 
Deputy President, Senior Member, or Non-presidential member. The 15 
necessary qualifications for appointment are dependent on the role.140 
Currently, only 16 of the 84 tribunal members are judges.141 Extensive 
guidelines set out how the President of the Tribunal determines which 
members hear a particular case.142 The care taken in developing these 
guidelines hints at the sensitivity of panel appointments. If New Zealand were 20 
to develop a tax panel at the High Court, it ought to look to Australia’s 
guidelines as a way of lessening the risk of “panel packing”,143 which the 
Judicature Modernisation Bill leaves as a very real opportunity. The Bill gives 
the Chief High Court Judge power to decide the basis on which cases are to 
be distributed to panel judges,144 as well as the power to assign a judge 25 
directly to a case. 145 The result is that the Chief Judge could manipulate the 
allocation of judges to ensure that judges with certain policy leanings or 
predispositions could hear particular cases, in an attempt to influence the 
case’s decision. The guidelines provide general and special rules for 
constituting the tribunal and a list of matters to be taken into account 30 
generally, which reduces the arbitrariness of a single judge’s choice in 
allocating a judge to a panel. 
Australia also incorporates a list and panel system for tax cases into 
the Federal Court. The tax list is geared towards facilitating case 
management. A tax list co-ordinating judge completes a pro forma 35 
questionnaire, leads a scheduling conference, and examines tax cases to 
                                               
139 Garry Downes, President of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal “Twenty Five Years of 
Tax Cases in the AAT; Eleven years of the “practical business tax” (Corporate Tax 
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140 Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975, s 7.  
141 “Who We Are” (9 September 2014) Administrative Appeals Tribunal <www.aat.gov.au>.  
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(14 November 2011). 
143 See generally Butler, above n 104, at 85. 
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ensure that like cases and issues are heard together.146 The practice note for 
the tax list provides that the co-ordinating judge will refer cases to the registry 
to be allocated to a docket judge. The individual docket system then provides 
for “Cases in some areas of law requiring particular expertise (including 
patents, taxation and admiralty)” to be randomly allocated to members of a 5 
specialist panel.147 Justice Spender claims that the Federal Court’s appellate 
decisions have “a certain authority” even though it is not a separate appeal 
court, because panels are “formed with specialist judges who tend to have an 
interest and expertise in one particular area of another”.148 Typically, the 
Chief Justice assigns two tax experts and one non-expert to an appeal panel, 10 
to balance the expertise against a broad perspective.149 Overall, the AAT and 
the Federal panels have been successful. Schabe and Blissenden praise the 
STCT as “a significant and worthwhile development in tax dispute resolution 
for which the Federal Government should be commended”,150 and the panel 
system has attracted praise in both Australia and New Zealand, but has also 15 
been criticised as an elitist system that favours certain judges according to 
their area of interest and geographical location.151 Former Chief Justice 
Michael Black argues that the combination of the docket system and panels 
is optimal, asserting that:152 
In this way, the Federal Court maximises the efficient use of its judicial 20 
expertise at trial and on appeal. At the appellate level, the system 
provides a facility for constituting appellate benches for specialist cases 
that permanent courts of appeal are unlikely to be able to match 
consistently. 
Overall, foreign specialist tax courts and panels have successfully developed 25 
an experienced and knowledgeable bench and an efficient system for tax 
dispute resolution. Yet, a recurrent criticism of these adjudicative and curial 
bodies questions their independence, and disapproves of their insularity. On 
the scale that these countries operate on, it may be that the price of 
specialisation is justifiable. But, for New Zealand, it is likely that concerns 30 
over insularity and perceived partiality would accompany specialisation, 
without the full benefits that these large, well-resourced, specialised tax 
dispute systems enjoy.  
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IV. New Zealand and Specialisation: Applying Legomsky’s 
Criteria 
This part will apply Legomsky’s criteria to evaluate whether a class of cases 
should be determined by specialist judges.153 The criteria provide a more 
principled way to consider specialisation than the responsive, ad-hoc process 5 
that has characterised the history of judicial specialisation in New Zealand. 
i. Mix of Law, Fact, and Discretion 
a. Discretion and the GAAR 
The first criterion suggests that discretionary and factual decisions favour 
specialisation. Discretionary decisions lend themselves to specialisation 10 
because the wider the scope of a judge’s choice, the more likely it is that the 
decision will best employ certain qualities possessed by specialist judges. 
These qualities include an understanding of the particular policy objectives, 
a reduced likelihood of oversights, a commitment to the pursuit of coherence, 
and reduced dependence on the views and adversarial skills of counsel.154  15 
Certainly, many areas of tax law are highly discretionary. Particularly, 
the application of general anti-avoidance provisions exercises a wide judicial 
discretion. Since the 1960’s,155 litigation in respect of the GAAR has been 
increased so that it now represents a significant component of tax challenges 
and litigation.156 Justice Glazebrook notes that many of the “most important” 20 
tax cases reaching the Supreme Court involve tax avoidance or evasion.157 
GAAR cases also exert a significant economic impact. The “bank conduit” 
cases involved some of the largest sums in the history of New Zealand 
litigation, with an estimated $2.4 billion in tax and interest claimed by the 
IRD.158 25 
The GAAR provides that “A tax avoidance arrangement is void as 
against the Commissioner for income tax purposes”.159 Section YA 1 defines 
a tax avoidance arrangement imprecisely and circularly, essentially declaring 
                                               
153 Legomsky, above n 41, at 20-32. 
154 Legomsky, above n 41, at 22-23. 
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that a tax avoidance arrangement is an arrangement that avoids tax.160 New 
Zealand courts have recognised the inescapable uncertainty of the provision, 
with the Supreme Court in Glenharrow holding that “it is simply not possible 
to meet the objectives of a general anti-avoidance provision by the use, for 
example, of precise definitions”.161 Inland Revenue’s interpretations 5 
statement similarly acknowledged that the courts are left with the task of 
identifying avoidance.162 The Supreme Court in Ben Nevis has formulated the 
most authoritative test: the parliamentary contemplation test.163 However, the 
test has been criticised for incorporating a “sniff test”, allowing judges wide 
discretion to point to indicia of avoidance such as artificiality, contrivance, 10 
and mismatches between the form of the arrangement and its economic and 
commercial realities, which “contribute to the overall foul smell of a 
transaction”.164 When tasked with navigating the incredibly wide discretion 
of GAAR cases, perhaps specialist judges with a keen ‘sense of smell’ are 
needed to fully appreciate the underlying policy. There is also a danger that 15 
generalist judges will be more inclined to write overly formalistic judgments 
when faced with this discretion.165 With avoidance cases comprising a 
significant percentage of tax cases, and those cases having such profound 
consequences for the development of the law and the New Zealand economy, 
the level of discretion afforded to judges in this area is a strong factor in 20 
support of specialisation. 
Although the highly discretionary nature of tax law arguably makes 
the most of the advantages of specialisation, it can also exacerbate its dangers. 
A specialist court or panel concentrates the power to make substantial policy 
decisions, affecting thousands of taxpayers, into the hands of a very small 25 
group of judges. Specialist judges are also more likely to harbour dogmatic 
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policy biases, which may have more severe consequences in highly 
discretionary areas of law. Constant exposure to similar cases can solidify a 
judge’s views on a legal issue, lessening their ability to bring a fresh mind to 
new cases. Where any policy biases are favourable to the Commissioner, 
there is a greater risk that taxpayers could perceive a bias in highly 5 
discretionary decisions. Compared to a panel system, an external court would 
worsen these concerns regarding bias and idiosyncratic development of the 
law because judges on an external court would not decide other non-tax 
related cases and would lack a wider exposure to other legal issues. 
b. Factual Issues and Expert Evidence 10 
Avoidance cases (as well as many other types of tax cases) involve difficult 
factual questions that demand specialisation, with President North declaring 
that the presence of avoidance is “… ultimately a question of fact”.166 To 
decide whether an arrangement is economically and commercially realistic, 
judges must be able to analyse factually complex financial arrangements. 15 
Although specialist judges may cope best with the factual complexity 
of tax cases, they are particularly at risk of developing a narrow judicial 
perspective and pigeonholing certain fact situations that they are frequently 
exposed to. For instance, Sir Ivor Richardson has observed that:  
… on the factual side, if you listen to a diet of asset accretion cases, I 20 
suspect it is easy to become cynical of standard explanations of 
discrepancies between expenditures on living and capital assets and 
reported incomes… 
Yet, in highly factual decisions, it is particularly important that a judge bring 
a fresh mind to the particular case.  25 
The extent to which expert evidence may alleviate factual difficulties 
is relevant. Judges have been somewhat hostile, perhaps justifiably,167 to the 
inclusion of expert evidence in tax cases. In Penny v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue,168 the Commissioner disputed evidence on the basis that it related 
to questions of law, but for many tax issues, the relationship between law and 30 
fact is nebulous. In the recent Court of Appeal avoidance case, Alesco,169 the 
Court acknowledged that expert evidence may assist the Court’s 
understanding of factual context “… where the impugned arrangement falls 
within a novel or sophisticated economic environment”.170 Yet, the Court 
rapidly denied that expert evidence was necessary, stating that events at trial 35 
reflected “an increasing but unacceptable trend of resorting to experts to add 
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to the armoury of advocacy”.171 Overall, the factual problems associated with 
tax cases are exacerbated by a tendency of the judiciary to regard expert 
evidence as adversarial or simply “not particularly relevant”.172 
ii. Technical Complexity and Cohesiveness 
Legomsky’s second criteria convincingly favours specialisation; tax is 5 
extremely technically complex. Specialists are better equipped to deal with 
this complexity and to produce more sound judgments because of their 
dedicated familiarity with tax laws. Identified specialist judges are also able 
to receive more targeted professional development and tend to hold a greater 
commitment to educating themselves in the specialised area. Legomsky 10 
outlines four factors suggesting technical complexity: size of the relevant 
legislation, organisational complexity, existence of a specialised terminology, 
and fact-finding that requires extra-legal knowledge.173 
a. Size of the Legislation 
The sheer volume of statutes,174 regulations, cases, rulings, interpretations, 15 
and rules is massive, and increasing in volume and effect each year. The 
Income Tax Act 2007 alone is some 3,852 pages and is New Zealand’s largest 
piece of legislation. This does not indicate drafting failures; the Rewrite 
Advisory Panel had remarkable success in redrafting the Income Tax Act to 
enhance simplicity and readability.175 Lengthy legislation is not unique to 20 
New Zealand. The inherent features of tax law mean that other countries have 
all needed to develop myriad laws and regulations to define and capture taxes. 
As Prebble observes, the complexities of tax law often arise because of 
features innate to any tax system: unavoidably arbitrary geographical 
distinctions, artificialities in income years, and an unprincipled 25 
capital/revenue distinction are all intractable problems.176 Accordingly, the 
voluminous complexity of tax law is unlikely to decrease over time, and this 
is not only necessary, but also usually desirable when other values of a tax 
system, such as fairness and certainty, are incompatible with simplicity.177 
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b. Organisational Complexity 
Tax law involves a high degree of organisational complexity. The Income 
Tax Act is the only legislation not drafted by the Parliamentary Counsel 
Office, perhaps in recognition of its technical complexity.178 Because of this 
unusual drafting process, the legislation takes on a unique organisational 5 
structure, with alphanumeric numbering and functional organisation. Rapid 
and technical developments often take place outside of legislation in tax 
information bulletins, determinations, interpretation guidelines and 
statements, operational statements, product and public rulings, and standard 
practice statements.  10 
Furthermore, in an increasingly global economy, the organisational 
complexity rises because of the addition of double tax treaties or provisions 
geared towards cross-border arrangements. It is likely that even more major 
conceptual developments are to come in the next few decades because the 
complexity of tax law is inextricably linked to the rapidly changing 15 
international economy.  
c. Specialised Terminology and Extra-Legal Knowledge 
Specialised terminology does not contribute to tax’s complexity because most 
technical terms are obvious to a non-expert or can be explained by counsel. 
However, the fact-finding endeavour of tax law will often require extra-legal 20 
knowledge from the fields of accounting or economics. Legislation will often 
refer to accounting standards or practices and an understanding of so-called 
“economic realities” is central to the application of the GAAR. More 
fundamentally, the lack of a basic definition of “income” has necessitated the 
incorporation of accounting and economic principles.179 25 
d. Drawbacks to Technical Expertise 
However, a mastery of the technical complexity of tax law may have 
drawbacks. Baum has warned that the risk of judicial activism is greater with 
specialist judges because specialists with expertise through constant work in 
one field tend to feel greater confidence in their judgment than their generalist 30 
counterparts.180 This confidence means that judges are more inclined to 
making sweeping policy decisions, when they may not be best placed to 
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anticipate the fiscal (or other) consequences without access to full 
parliamentary resources.  
e. A Crisis of Confidence? 
Although the complexity of tax law is relatively undoubted, the extent to 
which the New Zealand judiciary is capable of dealing with this complexity 5 
is contested. In a controversial article, Tony Molloy QC criticised the 
judiciary’s institutional competence in dealing with complex cases, stating 
that: 181 
the courts produce a plethora of judgments from which it is clear that 
counsel, or the judge—and frequently both counsel and the judge—10 
have been trying to grapple with areas of the law beyond the level of 
their skill or experience.  
Molloy’s comments in this article, along with a tirade of statements to the 
National Business Review, were widely criticised.182 Attorney-General Chris 
Finlayson condemned the comments as "a vulgar, crude and intemperate 15 
attack on our judicial system"183 and the National Standards Committee of the 
Law Society ordered Molloy to pay $1000.184 Yet, it seems that Molloy’s 
sentiments are not entirely isolated and the debate over the judiciary’s 
competence has been heated. High profile barrister Anthony Grant employed 
similarly strong language in bluntly claiming, “The age of the generalist has 20 
passed… Litigants know this and are reluctant to submit a dispute in a 
specialised area of law to a Judge who has no known competency in that area 
of law”.185 
Statements such as these have contributed to what the Law 
Commission described as the “awkward question of whether there is a want 25 
of confidence in some High Court judges, particularly in the commercial law 
area”.186 Criticisms of the judiciary’s technical competence and the decline 
in tax cases support the idea that there is a crisis of confidence. However, the 
Law Commission has pointed to several objective measures of the quality of 
generalist High Court decisions. The Commission looked at how other 30 
jurisdictions receive New Zealand judgments and found plenty of examples 
of overseas cases citing New Zealand judgments approvingly.187 The 
Commission also considered whether overseas institutions were using New 
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Zealand as a jurisdiction for their business affairs, and they highlighted 
evidence that there have been 7,500 foreign trust registrations in New 
Zealand in October 2006-November 2012,188 which does not support the 
notion that confidence in the New Zealand jurisdiction is lacking. The Report 
also cited the collective submission of New Zealand judges, which remarks 5 
that “there does not seem to be any evidence that appeals from generalist 
judges are more likely to be overturned on appeal”.189 It seems that the 
perception, particularly as expressed by many lawyers, on the competence 
of the judiciary in technically complex cases is not entirely supportable in 
view of this evidence.  10 
Interestingly, although the views expressed by actors in the tax 
system vary widely, there is a perceptible division between judges and 
lawyers in the specialisation debate.190 It may be that tax lawyers, who often 
focus solely on tax law, are more inclined to rally for what they perceive to 
be improvements to the tax system that they exclusively deal with. Those 15 
who work wholly in tax law would presumably want to privilege the 
resolution of tax disputes over other cases, and have a particular interest in 
disputes being settled at court, rather resolved by the disputes system. On the 
other hand, judges may be better positioned to holistically gauge the 
consequences of specialisation for the justice system overall. It is improper 20 
to dismiss the legitimacy of the insights that lawyers offer as being purely 
myopic or self-interested, but the interests of different stakeholders in the 
wider court system must be considered when referring to the specialisation 
debate.  
f. Cohesion 25 
Legomsky suggests that a cohesive area of law containing substantial 
interrelationship can benefit from specialisation because specialist judges 
have a greater appreciation for the overall scheme of the law and can decide 
cases without creating unintended consequences for other cases within that 
branch of law. The complexity of tax law prevents its classification as 30 
‘cohesive’, which counts against specialisation. Specialisation may also 
impinge on the overall cohesion and accessibility of the court framework. 
Damage to the organisation of the court framework may create difficulties 
for litigants to determine where a particular claim lies and a panel within the 
High Court could internally fragment the Court. As a by-product of this 35 
fragmentation, the valuable collegiality amongst High Court judges may be 
eroded, particularly if divisions are seen as elitist or insular.191 
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iii. Dynamism 
The dynamism of tax law favours specialisation because specialist judges’ 
commitment to following developments best enables them to keep apace of 
dynamic movements. 
Although tax law is subject to rapid changes, its existence as a primary 5 
area of law is long-standing. Unlike the administrative law division of the 
High Court, which became less necessary as other High Court judges became 
more aware of and conversant in public law matters, tax law is unlikely to 
become more mainstreamed in the judicial conscious.  
Tax law is dynamic for several reasons. First, it is an area that is 10 
aggressively tested by taxpayers, with Harley suggesting that “as taxpayers 
find new ways of acting just outside the boundary of what is taxable, so the 
government changes the definition of what is taxable to account for the new 
challenge. This is why there are so many Income Tax Amendment Acts each 
year and why tax law becomes so complicated”.192 Taxpayers match each 15 
move by the Commissioner with an increasingly sophisticated arrangement, 
precipitating more laws.193  
Tax law is also exceptionally dynamic because of its political 
exposure. The 1993 New Zealand Law Conference discussed how “Tax is the 
classic area in which the law and politics interact on a daily basis”.194 Most 20 
political parties campaign on tax reform proposals and the tax system is often 
subject to frequent reforms in service of political agendas.195 For instance, the 
notion of a capital gains tax is gaining political traction and it presents an 
example of tax reform that would undoubtedly add layers of complexity to 
the tax system that specialist judges may be best equipped to navigate.196  25 
Sir Ivor Richardson attributed the dynamism of tax law to the 
economic and social objectives that it serves, concluding that “… there is no 
other area of our law which is so subject to constant review and change”.197 
As well as substantive changes to the law, attitudes towards taxation and 
compliance can shift and alter the volume of cases. The former President of 30 
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the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal noted that “fashions in tax 
avoidance” could cause significant fluctuations in the volume of cases coming 
before the courts.198  
Any specialisation would need to be flexible enough to withstand a 
changing caseload, according to political, policy, and compliance changes. In 5 
this respect, a tax panel is preferable to an independent court, because it can 
cope better with fluctuating caseloads by having judges sit on other cases 
when there is reduced demand for tax litigation. Ultimately, generalist courts 
would allow for the greatest flexibility. 
iv. Degree of Isolation 10 
The degree of isolation of an area of law is a double-edged sword, at times 
favouring specialisation and at others favouring generalism. Legomsky 
identifies discreteness and uniqueness as the properties of isolation.  
Tax law is discrete, even though cases often involve issues that are 
equally classifiable as, inter alia; company law, property law, or criminal 15 
law. The discreteness of tax can be narrowing to the perspectives of 
specialist judges. Justice French has spoken out against specialist courts 
stating that: 199 
One of the great strengths of the law is the facility it offers to cross-
fertilise concepts and approaches from one area to another. 20 
Specialisation leads to intellectual inbreeding and risks the 
development of excessively comfortable relationships between judges 
and members of the relevant specialist bar.  
Perhaps the scarce evidence of the cross-fertilisation of other legal concepts 
into tax law signals that it is already isolated and parochial, when this should 25 
not necessarily be the case. It may be that the lack of connections with other 
areas of law is not due to the nature of tax law, but because of an already 
blinkered perspective of tax practitioners or judges. Caron suggests that the 
misperception that tax law is a self-contained body of law has “impaired the 
development of tax law by ignoring insights from other areas of law that 30 
should inform the tax debate”.200 In the Australian context, Justice Gordon 
has remarked, “Another effect of specialisation and myopia in the tax 
profession is the inability, failure or refusal to embrace the particular facts of 
a problem”.201 Justice Gordon pointed to Aid/Watch Incorporated v 
Commissioner of Taxation,202 as an example of a case with a pronounced need 35 
to think “outside of the tax sphere” 203 and look to the general law of charities 
                                               
198 Downes, above n 139. 
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to determine whether the political activities of a taxpayer institution defeated 
its charitable characterisation, despite the case’s classification as a tax case.204 
The way in which the New Zealand Supreme Court did not characterise the 
materially similar case of Re Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated205 as 
a tax case206 demonstrates the artificiality of dividing off an area of law and 5 
shows how tax provisions often operate in broader contexts and involve 
overlapping areas of a law. Judge Barber commented that in cases before the 
TRA, “all sorts of legal problems only indirectly related to the tax situation 
arise,” such as commercial, trust, or criminal issues.207 In the many cases that 
are not strictly tax-specific, a specialist tax judge is no better equipped than a 10 
generalist is. 
 Tax law may be described as unique because analogies are unlikely to 
be drawn between the resolution or reasoning of cases in other fields. 
Although the Income Tax Act is not a code, tax law is primarily statute based, 
and tax law has developed unique processes of statutory interpretation,208 15 
such as the parliamentary contemplation test, where orthodox, traditional 
methods of interpretation have been inappropriate.209 However, unique 
approaches to statutory interpretation have been criticised by the likes of 
Justice Kirby, who stated that “It is hubris… to consider that 'their Act' is 
special and distinct from general movements in statutory construction which 20 
have been such a marked feature of our legal system…”.210 Again, it may be 
that tax law itself is not isolated, but practitioners of tax law further isolate 
the law.  
Whatever the causes of the isolation, it gives rise to an insensitivity of 
generalist judges to tax implications of their judgments, whereby a judge’s 25 
decision in an ostensibly unrelated case can have a ripple effect on tax law. 
Isolating tax law further by removing it from the general court system or from 
other generalist judges, heightens this risk. Prebble has commented on a series 
of problematic decisions in Europe by the generalist European Court of 
Justice (ECJ), which have posed a threat to the domestic tax base of some 30 
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European Countries.211 For instance, several decisions of the ECJ struck down 
Germany’s controlled foreign company regime or the United Kingdom’s 
group relief rules on the basis that they were unjustified restrictions on the 
freedom of establishment. These decisions are sensible in terms of general 
company and European law principles, but they can have unfortunate 5 
consequences on these countries’ ability to protect their domestic tax base. 
Prebble comments that the ECJ‘s approach:212 
…causes difficulties for the governments of EU Member States which 
want to collect tax. Their efforts to counter tax avoidance and prevent 
taxpayers from moving income to what are effectively tax havens can 10 
be readily undone by the ECJ. 
On one hand, it is arguable that greater judicial specialisation within the ECJ 
might have avoided these problems, but it illustrates the problems for general 
courts that arise when generalist judges are distanced from specialised areas.  
v. Repetition 15 
Areas of law involving a high degree of repetition are more likely to warrant 
specialisation because they can maximise efficiency. Rather than requiring 
many judges to become familiar with a repetitive case model, specialisation 
targets the initial education at a smaller pool of judges. Repetitive cases 
intensify the need for consistency within an area of law, and consistency is 20 
best served by judicial specialisation because specialisation brings 
familiarity and exposes a case to fewer conflicting adjudicators.213  
The presence of repetitive cases may pose problems for judicial 
recruitment, when the position attracts many judges because of the diversity 
it offers. It is difficult to predict whether tax judicial specialisation would 25 
improve or impair recruitment. The wide range of work of generalist judges 
may be attractive to potential judges.214 Perhaps it would even come as a 
relief to many candidates to know they would not hear tax cases.215 On the 
other hand, an opportunity to delve further into specialisation is appealing to 
judges with a strong interest in that area. 30 
However, although avoidance cases dominate substantive tax 
litigation, the remaining cases often sprawl a range of technical or procedural 
issues,216 undermining the characterisation of tax law as an overly repetitive 
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branch of law. Even within avoidance cases, there is minimal repetition and 
different arrangements require separate factual examination.  
vi. Clannishness 
The clannishness of lawyers, government officials, and experts within the 
tax field also favours generalism. Most law firms will have a dedicated tax 5 
team and lawyers rarely move in and out of a tax specialisation because of 
the significant time taken to build up expertise. This clannishness can 
increase the chances of perceptions of bias because of the familiarity of 
adjudicators and other actors in the system.  
The tax community’s clannishness may also give rise to a greater risk 10 
of complacency and a reduction in innovative jurisprudence because of the 
minimal exposure to outside judicial thinking. A fresh perspective is 
necessary to question assumptions or settled modes of judicial thinking. New 
Zealand’s comparatively small legal population makes clannishness more 
troubling. From the outset, a handful of law professors will teach most New 15 
Zealand tax lawyers, who then progress through the insular tax community, 
attending tax-specific conferences, professional development and 
networking. Caron observes that there is a self-selection bias before law 
students even begin their education, stating that “Tax courses are perceived 
to be reserved for what in my day used to be called ‘tax geeks’ – accountant-20 
types who carry calculators and plastic pocket-protectors for their multi-color 
array of pens”.217 Any specialist judges are likely to come from this small, 
closed tax community and may consequently develop a narrow judicial 
perspective.  
Another consequence of this clannishness is its exposure to 25 
manipulation. Justice Glazebrook suggests, “A major risk of specialization is 
that judicial objectivity may be lost due to actors in the sphere becoming too 
familiar, and judges thus becoming vulnerable to interest group 
manipulation”.218 Interest groups will no longer have to spread their efforts 
across a general bench in the hopes of influencing decision making, leaving 30 
few tax judges more susceptible to capture or pressure by interested parties.  
Greater tax judiciary specialisation may also damage the 
representativeness of the bench because the profession often lacks 
diversity.219 Worldwide, there is a concentration of men in the tax 
profession,220 which risks exacerbating the unsatisfactory gender diversity of 35 
the judiciary.221 New Zealand is unexceptional; lawyers who spend over 50% 
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of their time on tax law fall in a 39:61 female to male ratio.222 Indeed, there 
is a question of whether the small tax community would provide an adequate 
(let alone diverse) pool of judicial candidates. Judging is, in itself, a legal 
specialisation,223 with only a select number of lawyers possessing the 
necessary qualifications and attributes. Limiting the potential pool to a single 5 
area of law may prove difficult in terms of recruitment. 
Despite the clannishness of tax law, there have been few applications 
for recusal for judges of the Taxation Review Authority, perhaps suggesting 
that arguments relying on perceptions of bias are overstated, since the 
existence of a single tax adjudicator has not translated to a significant number 10 
of recusal applications. Mr John Russell made the only recusal application to 
an Authority, Judge Barber, who refused.224 Mr Russell alleged that Judge 
Barber was biased because he had consistently held against Mr Russell in 65 
cases in 1989-2005, 225 which involved the “Russell Template”, a tax template 
that Mr Russell designed. Mr Russell argued that Judge Barber had “formed 15 
very firm views concerning the template”226 and he highlighted the fact that 
Judge Barber had described him as a “person who is in business substantially 
as a tax avoidance specialist” and that his “obsession with saving tax means 
that he has a mental block over schemes which have gone beyond tax planning 
into the realm of tax avoidance”.227 It was unnecessary to decide at the High 20 
Court or Court of Appeal whether there was apparent bias because Justice 
Wylie reheard the substantive case at the High Court and there was no 
suggestion that he was biased. Although this case represents an isolated event 
of recusal application, it demonstrates how the risk of apparent bias can flow 
from a single specialised judge forming fixed views as a result of hearing the 25 
same types of cases. 
vii. Peculiar Importance of Consistency 
Legomsky argues that specialisation helps ensure the law’s internal 
consistency. This is important in relation to tax law because fairness is an 
essential aim of the income tax system;228 taxpayers who are similarly placed 30 
should be taxed at a consistent rate. Compliance is often dependent on 
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perceptions of fairness229 and the fair resolution of disputes is essential to 
overall perceptions of fairness.   
Recently, tax avoidance has begun to attract the wider public’s 
attention, with increased political and media coverage. The IRD’s report on 
the taxation of multinational companies noted “Media comment around the 5 
world has focused on the unfairness of the low levels of tax paid by some 
multinationals”, 230 which suggests that the adjudication of tax disputes may 
already be perceived to favour large multinational parties.  
Taxpayers are also often indirectly in competition, heightening the 
need for consistent decision-making to avoid unfair tax advantages for some 10 
taxpayers over their competitors. Where competing taxpayers structure their 
affairs identically, decisions must be consistent between taxpayers to avoid 
economic inefficiencies.    
In a small country like New Zealand, the difference between specialist 
and generalist adjudicators may be minimal. In commenting on the decisions 15 
coming from the TRA, Harley suggested that there is “bound to be 
inconsistency” with five Authorities deciding cases with similar issues, but 
that the inconsistency is no greater than for some 24 to 26 High Court judges 
at the Court of Appeal.231 If a mere five authorities is enough to create 
inconsistency in the law, then a tax panel is unlikely to remedy this problem. 20 
viii. Degree of Controversy 
Legomsky argues that controversial subject matter favours generalism 
because controversy heightens the problems associated with concentrated 
judicial power and the risk of apparent bias. The controversy of tax judgments 
arises for several reasons.  25 
First, the large amount of money involved and the far-reaching 
consequences of tax law mean that decisions are of considerable public 
interest. Sir Ivor Richardson affirms the significance of tax law, asserting, 
“There is no other legislation which is so far reaching and pervasive and 
which touches human activities at so many points”.232 30 
Highly discretionary decisions, such as those in anti-avoidance cases, 
tend to be the most controversial because the risk of policy-making or judicial 
activism tends to be the most clearly exhibited in this context. On the topic of 
tax avoidance, Keating asks:233 
What is it about tax avoidance that causes so much controversy? No 35 
other single provision of the Income Tax Act is so commonly litigated. 
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No other aspect of tax generates as much heated debate in both tax 
practice and academic circles. All leading cases are reviewed and 
analysed endlessly, and every new decision is seized upon.  
Tax cases also create a high degree of controversy because litigation 
is effectively between the individual and the government,234 with the result 5 
that the resolution of tax cases is of significant public importance. McKay 
suggests that taxation is a fundamental element of the relationship between 
the state and the citizen, arguing: 235 
Such is the impact of taxation, so vital is it to the character, the quality, 
of both our day-to-day lives as individuals, and the overall social face 10 
of our society, that it seems to me to be a matter of constitutional 
significance… 
The government’s interest in taxation is immense, with over $53.8 billion 
collected in the 2012/2013 tax year.236 The Commissioner also arguably 
benefits from a power imbalance in litigation,237 with the full resources of 15 
the state behind her. This intensifies the need for public justice in tax cases 
and suggests that an ordinary court of record ought to hear cases because it 
is more likely to be open, accessible, and transparent to most citizens. 
Constitutionally, the judiciary is one of the few, limited checks on 
Parliament’s otherwise unrestrained power to impose tax. Sir Ivor 20 
Richardson has noted that, more recently, the judiciary has adopted a less 
protective role in respect of individual taxpayers against the Executive.238 
This shift may mean that the court system affords the taxpayer even less 
protection from the state’s whims, intensifying the controversy of decisions. 
In many other civil disputes, litigants have a wider range of dispute 25 
resolution available to them outside the court system, such as arbitration or 
mediation. Because tax litigants do not have the same choice of forum and 
degree of voluntariness towards litigation, the need for the court process to 
limit controversy and, in turn, be respected as an independent and reputable 
forum, is greater.    30 
Tax could also be described as a subject matter with “high emotional 
content” because of the confiscation of property that it involves.239 Certainly, 
some regard taxation as an extraction of private wealth and a deeply intrusive 
power of the state. Judge Barber also observes that the “harrowing” process 
prior to a case reaching court can add to the emotional content of tax cases, 35 
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resulting in an “air of great tension and ill feeling between the parties” that 
strengthens the need for an undoubtedly independent adjudicator.240 Indeed, 
he recounts instances of taxpayers weeping inconsolably upon the realisation 
that they were finally “actually in an independent judicial forum”.241 Most of 
the countries surveyed in part III have additional measures in place for the 5 
protection of taxpayers, such as a dedicated tax ombudsman in Australia or a 
“taxpayer bill of rights” in America.242 There is a risk that, absent these 
checks, a small tax court with a greater susceptibility to bias or corruption 
may corner a taxpayer, leaving him with limited recourse.243 Of course, even 
where appeal is an option, the appellate court would remain bound by the tax 10 
court’s findings of facts, which may be of little consolation in frequently 
factual tax decisions.  
Tax avoidance scholarship has frequently engaged with questions of 
the morality of tax avoidance. With this degree of emotional content, a 
judge’s particular persuasion on an issue is even more likely to enter into that 15 
judge’s decision-making, and may lead to the development of a bias. The 
exposure of many taxpayer companies to a great deal of moral and ethical 
scrutiny244 also means that the decisions are more likely to be highly 
emotional and controversial, heightening the need for public justice in the 
ordinary courts.  20 
However, it seems that the controversy of tax cases persists, even 
when the general courts decide them. Many commentators have labelled 
recent decisions, particularly in avoidance cases, as “controversial” and been 
critical of the Commissioner’s success rate.245 Coleman notes that the 
successful streak of appeals by taxpayers in the 1990s has now ended and has 25 
been replaced by a string of successes for the Commissioner, emboldening 
her to take “…a more and more aggressive stand in litigation”.246 In a series 
of interviews with tax lawyers, accountants, academics, and former IRD 
investigators, there was some evidence of a feeling that the generalist 
judiciary was increasingly likely to side with the Commissioner’s position, 30 
with the results suggesting, “The participants felt that there had been a shift 
in judicial attitude when interpreting the general anti-avoidance provision. 
Further, this shift has swung the pendulum the way of the Commissioner.”247  
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Greater judicial specialisation may send a symbolic message to 
taxpayers that the judiciary takes these controversial matters seriously. 
Commentators have made similar arguments in the context of sexual offence 
courts, claiming that a court of special status or esteem can be appropriate in 
some circumstances to signal to the community the importance and gravity 5 
of sexual offending to the justice system and to “send a message to victims 
of sexual offending which may encourage reporting of offences.248 Greater 
judicial specialisation could have an important symbolic value in respect of 
tax law, by establishing that the resolution of tax disputes has a special status 
in New Zealand. This may encourage greater investment in New Zealand as 10 
a business jurisdiction,249 as well as greater compliance. The opposite 
possibility exists; taking tax outside the mainstream court system might 
simply create a perception of tax matters’ lesser importance and confine 
taxpayers to a court of lower standing, depending on the specialist court’s 
strength and resourcing. 15 
Additionally, a differing perception of the status of a court may also 
influence the court’s ability to recruit judges, 250 as occurred in relation to 
Canada’s former Board of Review. The Law Commission observed that a 
judicial career often involves surrendering the possibility of a career with real 
standing; recruitment may become even more difficult if candidates perceive 20 
specialist courts to be less prestigious.251  
ix. Logistics: Volume, Time, and Geographic Distribution 
Even though many of these criteria point towards specialisation, logistics 
produce the greatest and most fatal objection. In a review of the Judicature 
Act, the Law Commission acknowledged that “It would not be sensible for 25 
any jurisdiction to introduce change into a quality generalist jurisdiction 
unless the need to do so can be properly demonstrated”. This need is not yet 
demonstrated. Much of the efficiency gain from a specialised judicial system 
relies on a steady stream of cases, which the small jurisdiction of New 
Zealand would fail to supply.252 Additionally, specialisation renders the court 30 
system less responsive to fluctuations in the volume of cases in particular 
areas. Justice Glazebrook dismissed the possibility of an independent tax 
court on logistical grounds:253 
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In a jurisdiction as small as New Zealand… the creation of a separate 
court dealing with all tax cases is not really an option, particularly with 
the decline in tax cases being brought before the courts. Even in its 
heyday, the Taxation Review Authority could not support more than 
two judges…. 5 
There are few empirical studies of the volume of tax litigation, but many 
commentators echo Justice Glazebrook’s view that the number of tax cases is 
decreasing steadily. The Ministry of Justice’s review of Wellington and 
Auckland High Court registries in 2010 put tax law at just 3.8 per cent of the 
total sample of cases.254 The IRD has suggested that this trend is evidence that 10 
the disputes process was functioning effectively and reducing the need for 
litigation.255 However, in the Bar association’s submissions they noted, 
“Many of the countries that are actually embracing specialisation are 
relatively small, and that on the international experience size alone is not a 
significant inhibiting factor”.256 This claim is not borne out by surveys of 15 
similarly sized countries; the few specialist tax courts or panels in countries 
of comparable size to New Zealand is compelling evidence of the 
unfeasibility of further specialisation.257  
As well as the number of tax disputes, the type of disputes is relevant 
to any proposals for specialisation. On this point, Justice Glazebrook 20 
observed an increasing trend towards procedural disputes between 1996 and 
2008 because of “teething difficulties” caused by challenge proceedings 
procedures introduced in 1996.258 Substantive decisions heighten the benefits 
of specialisation because they are more likely to engage the judge’s specialist 
skill set and knowledge. The difference that judicial specialisation makes to 25 
the determination of procedural issues, judicial review decisions, or 
enforcement decisions, is minimal. However, Glazebrook J suggests that the 
rise in procedural issues has settled, observing that in the 2008-2013 period 
the number of procedural cases in the High Court had dropped to some five 
cases per year, compared to 14 procedural cases in the 2003-2008 period.259 30 
The “most important tax cases” before the Supreme Court between its 
introduction in 2003 and 2013 have featured a more balanced ratio between 
procedural and substantive issues; of the 12 tax cases before the Supreme 
Court, five involved procedural issues and the remainder involved tax 
avoidance or evasion and goods and services tax.260 Brown suggests that a 35 
reduction of procedural cases is not so obvious, arguing that “relatively few 
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of the cases involving Inland Revenue relate to substantive tax disputes (ie, 
disputes concerning the application of substantive taxing provisions)”.261 
Most commentators seem to agree that, at least of the substantive 
cases, tax avoidance is a dominant issue. Keating looks broadly at IRD’s 
attitude towards general anti-avoidance provisions, finding that between 2004 5 
and 2010 the department’s investigators sought approval to invoke the GAAR 
or the anti-avoidance rule of s 76 of the Goods and Services Tax Act 1985 
804 times, with approval granted in 724 instances. Keating concludes that tax 
avoidance is a “major feature of the New Zealand tax landscape” that 
consumes a “disproportionate amount of the resources of Inland Revenue, 10 
taxpayers, the courts and practitioners”.262 This has implication for the merits 
of specialisation. The controversy and discretion that are strongly associated 
with general anti-avoidance rules are heightened in these cases, militating 
against specialisation.  
Additionally, the “price” of administering a specialist court or panel 15 
is not simply figurative. A separate court “does not come cheap”,263 and 
although a panel would better utilise existing facilities and court systems, it 
would still involve additional administrative and managerial costs that are 
unlikely to be offset by any efficiency gains. New Zealand’s geographic 
dispersal would further complicate the logistics of specialisation. Legomsky 20 
notes, “A small pie is inconvenient enough, but having to carve it into even 
smaller segments exacerbates the problem”.264 Adjudicating a small number 
of tax cases across New Zealand’s major populations, presumably with a 
circuit system,265 is costly to administer and can lead to certain cities with 
backlogs of cases and others with an idle jurisdiction. 25 
Ultimately, the tax caseload is insufficient to justify further 
specialisation, and of the cases that do reach court, the procedural nature of 
many cases would not reap the full benefits of specialisation. Although these 
problems fall under a single criterion, the logistical problems associated with 
an inadequate caseload are fatal to the implementation of tax specialisation.   30 
x. Unique Procedural Needs 
Tax law does not feature particularly unique procedural needs. Already, the 
TRA has relaxed rules of evidence that allow it to receive any documents or 
information that assist with the effective dealing of the inquiry.266 Judge 
Barber described the TRA as a “slightly relaxed forum” that is “supposed to 35 
be trying to put the taxpayer a little bit at ease”.267 The procedural rules are 
                                               
261 Brown, above n 95, at 4. 
262 Keating, above n 156, at 115-116. 
263 Law Commission, above n 15, at 70. 
264 Legomsky, above n 41, at 31. 
265 This would follow the practice of the Taxation Review Authority, which is based in 
Wellington, but travels in circuit around New Zealand: Prebble and Prebble, above n 90, at 
248.  
266 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994, s 17(1).   
267 Riley and others, above n 65, at 475. 
47 
 
also relaxed for cases that fall under Pt 8 of the Tax Administration Act 1994 
that the High Court hears.268 An advantage of the Authority’s status as a 
tribunal is the room it has to develop fast-tracking or informal procedures in 
the future (as in Australia and Canada), which is a possibility that the more 
ossified High Court rules may limit.269 5 
Typically, taxpayers who take tax cases to court tend to be large 
companies represented by skilled and experienced advocates who are 
comfortable with formal court procedures. The high quality of advocacy in 
tax cases suggests that judges do not need to take a specialised and more 
active role in the exposition of a case.270  10 
xi. Special Need for Prompt Resolution 
A need for prompt resolution suggests that specialisation is desirable. 
Specialists are able to deal with cases more rapidly because less preparation 
and research around basic principles is necessary. Judges with technical 
knowledge of an area are also better able to quickly identify the issues in a 15 
case, and have less need for expert witnesses.271 The expediency of case 
progression corresponds to the financial burden of running the courts, which 
is transferred to litigants, who must invest privately raised capital, and to 
taxpayers, who fund the court system. Molloy argues that a further cost of an 
inefficient allocation of judicial time is that the system needs more judges, 20 
meaning additional judges must be appointed from a “lower strata” of 
candidates, in turn producing greater inefficiency and lower quality 
judgments.272 
There are many stages to a tax dispute, and most of them are unduly 
time-consuming, whether specialists adjudicate them or not. Tax law does not 25 
involve a peculiar need for prompt resolution; usually the taxpayer has the 
ability to defer disputed payments, which alleviates the hardship of a long 
                                               
268 Tax Administration Act 1994, s 136(16). 
269 In Australia, the Federal Court has a fast-track system that aims to deliver judgments 
within 6 weeks of the trial. The fast-track system incorporates measures such as replacing 
full proceedings with a case summary, dealing with most interlocutory applications on the 
papers, holding scheduling conferences, reducing discovery, holding pre-trial conferences, 
and conducting “chess-clock” style trials: “Fast Track System” Federal Court of Australia 
<www.fedcourt.gov.au>. In Canada, taxpayers can opt to proceed cases where the tax is less 
than $25,000 via the informal process. The informal process encompasses more relaxed and 
flexible rules of evidence and representation and it guarantees that the court fixes a hearing 
date within 180 days of the filing deadline for the reply and delivers judgments within 90 
days of the hearing: MacGregor and others, above n 134, at 95-97. 
270 Even supposing that tax judges need to adopt a different role to cater to unique procedural 
needs, there is little to suggest that those who are experts in taxation will be any more capable 
of performing this role. 
271 Katz observes that as well as the lesser need for expert witnesses to understand the 
complexities of the case, there is also likely to be less reliance on expert witness’ conclusions, 
stating, “again it should not be overlooked that the skill of the specialist advocate can extend 
to the embellishment of a submission that might muster some credence before a generalist 
judge, but would readily be seen for what it is by a specialist judge: John Katz “Access to 
Justice from the Perspective of the Commercial Community: Judicial Specialisation” (2012) 
18 AULR 37 at 39. 
272 Molloy, above n 4, at 20-21. 
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wait for a decision.273 However, the time per case of tax disputes is still 
unsatisfactory. Sir Ivor Richardson expressed an overall concern that 
“resolving tax disputes can take an unacceptably long time” and referred to 
the many years that pass before cases reached the Court of Appeal.274 The 
disputes process has also been criticised for being time-consuming.275  5 
Again, the best way to address these delays is by reforming the 
process’ existing form rather than adding a specialist court or panel system to 
the High Court. The High Court will benefit from insights into the facts 
provided by the TRA and the disputes process will help to narrow the range of 
issues even coming before the court. A specialist court may replace the 10 
Authority but it would be unlikely to deal with cases more efficiently than the 
already specialised tribunal and neither option would address the wait before 
a case even reaches court, which is a significant contributor to the delays in 
resolving tax cases.  
 15 
V. The Benchmark for Specialisation 
 
Although the focus thus far has been on tax law, tax law cannot, and should 
not, operate in isolation to the rest of the court system. Nor should any 
proposals for specialisation be considered without a view to the overall 20 
integrity of the court structure. The Law Commission’s call for a “coherent 
and principled framework for the court system” identifies the need to consider 
specialisation holistically, with a view to creating a system that will be robust 
and responsive to a changing legal environment in the future.276 Compared to 
existing specialist courts in New Zealand, there is arguably a more principled 25 
basis for the specialisation of tax cases than there has been for many existing 
specialist courts in New Zealand. However, the benchmark for greater 
specialisation cannot be measured against current specialist courts, especially 
when many of these courts lack a firm and consistent rationale. There is a risk 
that accepting the existing specialist courts as a mandate for further 30 
specialisation in the court system would open the floodgates to a proliferation 
of specialist courts or divisions fragmenting the High Court, as have occurred 
in the case of tribunals. This risk will become even more immediate should 
the Judicature Modernisation Bill be passed, empowering the Chief High 
Court judge to create new High Court panels.  35 
Finding the appropriate benchmark for specialisation is also not as 
simple as tallying Legomsky’s criteria to establish whether there are more 
numeric benefits or disadvantages to specialisation. The criteria are not of 
equal weighting and some factors more persuasively point towards or away 
                                               
273 Tax Administration Act 1994, s 128(2). 
274 Richardson, above n 83.  
275 Andrew Maples “Resolving Small Tax Disputes in New Zealand – Is There A Better 
Way?” (2011) 6(1) JATTA 96; James Peck and Andrew J Maples “The Tax Disputes Process 
in New Zealand: What about the Little Fellas?” (2010) 16 NZJTLP 348; Keating, above n 
96; Glazebrook, above n 91, at 15. 
276 Law Commission, above n 12, at 104. 
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from greater specialisation than others. Finally, although it is helpful to 
consider the overseas experiences of specialisation, which can highlight 
certain frequent problems or benefits of specialisation, it is also 
inappropriate to rely heavily on the approaches taken in further jurisdictions 
as an indication of the correct level of specialisation. Specialisation is deeply 5 
contextual and the size and structure of New Zealand’s court system does 
not provide a meaningful comparison to entirely base the appropriate level 
of specialisation in New Zealand on.   
Instead, the conclusion must be based on a balancing of all of these 
factors, including the existing level and success of tax specialisation in New 10 
Zealand, the impact of specialisation on the court system as a whole, the 
successes and shortfalls of specialisation overseas, and nuanced evaluation 
of Legomsky’s criteria.  
 
VI. Conclusion 15 
 
On the surface, these factors may appear to point towards specialisation. The 
nature of tax law establishes it as an obviously complex and dynamic area of 
law that stands to benefit from specialisation. Many commentators have 
pointed to issues with the Taxation Review Authority and the general court 20 
system, questioning the institutional proficiency of these organisations in 
dealing with the tax law in an effective and efficient manner. The introduction 
of greater judicial specialisation seems like an obvious answer to these 
problems, and it has been a broadly successful answer in countries such as 
America, Canada, and Australia. Judicial specialisation at the High Court 25 
level, through an independent court or internal panel, appears to hold plain 
and logical benefits; from greater judicial expertise flows higher quality 
decisions and increased efficiency. In light of this, it is tempting to suggest 
that a specialist tax court or panel is warranted in New Zealand.   
However, a closer inspection reveals that greater specialisation is not 30 
without a price, although this price is often more pernicious. Greater 
specialisation risks the development of idiosyncrasies in the development of 
the law, the fragmentation of the court system, and heightened controversy 
or perceptions of bias or appropriation by interest groups. This is not an 
abstract concern; criticisms of a lack of independence or appropriation are 35 
frequent across the overseas experience of specialisation and the history of 
judicial specialisation in New Zealand indicates a risk of specialist courts 
being used as a tool for policy intervention. Although the benefits of 
specialisation often vary in extent, the disadvantages associated with 
specialisation tend to be consistent and potentially devastating to a court’s 40 
perception across different applications of judicial specialisation. 
Not only does specialisation come at a “price”, but also the supposed 
payoff of specialisation is unlikely to be realised in New Zealand. As well 
as heightening the problems of a clannish and insular grouping of 
professionals, the logistical realities of a small country like New Zealand 45 
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prohibits the replication of successful specialist courts and panels in foreign 
jurisdictions and outweighs any arguments for the greater efficiency of 
specialist courts. New Zealand lacks the critical tax case volume that would 
enable judges to develop a specialisation, and numerous procedural cases 
coming before the courts often do not benefit from the enhanced expertise, 5 
efficiency, and internal consistency of specialisation. New Zealand simply 
does not have the size (both the size of the judiciary and the wider legal 
system) or resources to support tax judicial specialisation.   
Additionally, New Zealand is further separated from other judiciaries 
with tax specialisation by the existence of effective extra-judicial means of 10 
tax specialisation, such as the comprehensive disputes process, which 
continues to evolve and develop to become more efficient and respected. The 
Taxation Review Authority also continues to occupy an important position 
in New Zealand’s court system, even though it has been affected by 
fluctuations in workload due to systemic and policy reforms of the tax 15 
system. Many of the issues faced by the tribunal and the disputes process 
tend to revolve around how expensive and time-consuming these forums are. 
However, these issues are unlikely to be directly caused by problems 
associated with specialisation, but are more closely tied to the resourcing and 
management of these forums, which have been subject to a series of ongoing, 20 
promising reforms and enhancements since their fairly recent introduction. 
These reforms will also ensure that the critical perception of independence 
of the TRA is maintained. 
There are countless arguments that could be made for the advantages 
and disadvantages of judicial specialisation. Yet, overseas experience, an 25 
appreciation for the New Zealand context of specialisation, and an 
evaluation of the normative debate suggests that many of the theoretical 
benefits of specialisation would not translate to a small New Zealand 
context, while the inefficiencies, appropriation or bias risk, clannishness, and 
isolated development of the law would mean that the price that New Zealand 30 
would pay for a specialised judicial society in respect of tax law, would far 
outweigh the benefits that specialisation purports to offer.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1. Number of Tax Review Authority Cases by Year.* 
 
 
* Courts of New Zealand does not publish statistics relating to the case volumes of specific tribunals, such as the 
Taxation Review Authority, but only publishes general workload statistics for a collection of 24 select tribunals, 
including the Taxation Review Authority. These statistics are instead compiled from the cases reported in the New 
Zealand Tax Cases journal.  
  
Year # of Cases
1974 30
1975 24
1976 22
1977 11
1978 25
1979 24
1980 33
1981 40
1982 62
1983 71
1984 89
1985 87
1986 110
1987 100
1988 82
1989 108
1990 132
1991 71
1992 86
1993 59
1994 38
1995 45
1996 59
1997 41
1998 25
1999 28
2000 21
2001 9
2002 14
2003 29
2004 30
2005 16
2006 10
2007 13
2008 13
2009 19
2010 11
2011 12
2012 11
2013 11
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Appendix 2. Taxation Review Authority Appointments.* 
 
 
Year Name Term
Tenure 
(Years)
Appointment or Re-
Appointment
Gazette Notice 
(Gazette Year/ 
Page Reference)
1981 Paul Barber 1981-1988 7 Appointment 1981/2371
1982 John Bathgate 1982-1989 7 Appointment 1982/1383
1984 David Sheppard 1984-1991 7 Appointment 1985/129
1987 Patrick Keane 1987-1994 7 Appointment 1987/1233
1988 Paul Barber 1988-1995 7 Re-Appointment 1988/3646
1989 John Bathgate 1989-1996 7 Re-Appointment 1989/865
1991 Antony Willy 1991-1998 7 Appointment 1991/3223
1994 Patrick Keane 1994-2001 7 Re-Appointment 1994/1400
2003 Paul Barber 2003-2006 3 Re-Appointment 2003/843
2012 Allison Sinclair 2012-2017 5 Appointment 2012/66  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
*Between 2006-2012, Paul Barber continued to act as an authority, but there does not appear to be a record of 
this re-appointment in the Gazette. Additionally, Board of Review judge A.J. Lloyd Martin continued to act as an 
Authority once the Board became the Taxation Review Authority. 
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Appendix 3. Sitting Days of the Taxation Review Authority* 
 
Year Sitting Days
1997 72
1998 73
1999 103
2000 50
2001 21
2002 26
2003 96  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* These figures are taken from the Annual Reports of the Department of Courts in 2003 and 1999: Annual Report 
(Department for Courts, Annual Report, 1999) at 99; Annual Report (Department for Courts, Annual Report, 2003) 
at 105. Following the merger of the Department of Courts and the Ministry of Justice in 2003, these statistics were 
no longer collected and published.  
The figures do not always accurately reflect the demand for the Authority because complex cases can skew the 
total sitting days. For instance, in 1995, a single case occupied an entire 43 sitting days: Case R 25 (1994) 16 
NZTC 6,120.  
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Appendix 4: Specialisation in Countries of Similar Size. 
 
Country
Population 
(million)*
Tax 
Specialisation 
(Court Level)?
Tax Specialisation 
(Tribunal Level)? Other Notes
New Zealand 4.51 No Yes
New Zealand's specialist tribunal is the 
Taxation Review Authority.¹
Ireland 4.63 No Yes
A  specialist, independent Appeal 
Commissioner hears appeals by 
taxpayers.²
Lebanon 4.82 Yes Yes
Although not solely a tax specialisation, 
Lebanon has administrative courts and 
tribunals that hear tax matters.³
Norway 5.04 No No
There is no tax judicial specialisation in 
Norway, either curial or adjudicative.⁴
Singapore 5.41 No Yes
Singapore has three Boards of Review for 
tax matters; the Goods & Services Tax 
Board of Review, the Income Tax Board of 
Review, and the Valuation Review Board.⁵
Finland 5.43 Yes Yes
Finland has a Board of Adjustment as the 
first appeal authority and then further 
appeals may go to the Administrative 
Court.⁶
Slovakia 5.45 Yes No
Slovakia has an administrative law section 
within its regional courts that usually act 
as the court of fist instance in 
administrative matters.⁷
Denmark 5.62 No Yes
The Danish National Tax Tribunal hears 
tax matters. The taxpayer may also request 
an expert opinion at several stages of the 
dispute, including at the City Court/High 
Court stage.⁸
 
* Population Statistics are taken from the projections for 2013 in: United Nations Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs/Population Division World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision, Volume I: Comprehensive 
Tables (New York, 2013) at 57. 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
1 Taxation Review Authorities Act 1994. 
2 Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 (Ireland), s 850; “Office of the Appeal Commissioners (for the purposes of the 
Income Tax Acts)” (1999) Office of the Appeal Commissioners <www.appealcommissioners.ie>. 
3 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Peer Review Report 
Phase 1: Legal and Regulatory Framework: Lebanon (OECD Publishing, 2012) at 11-12. 
4 Bård Tønder “The Control of the Legislative and the Executive Power by Norwegian Courts” (24 June 2014) 
The Supreme Court of Norway <www.domstol.no>. 
5 Singapore Income Tax Act (c 134) 2014, s 78; Income Tax (Board of Review) (Appeals Procedure) 
Regulations 1990; Goods and Services Tax Act (c 117a, s 50(10)) Goods and Services Tax (Board of Review) 
Regulations 1993; Property Tax Act (c 254, s 68) Valuation Review Board (Appeals Procedure) Regulations 
1990. 
6 “Tax Administration and Appeals” Vero: Finnish Tax Administration <www.Vero.fi>. 
7 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Peer Review Report 
Phase 1: Legal and Regulatory Framework: Slovakia (OECD Publishing, 2012) at 14. 
8 OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes: Peer Review Report 
Phase 1: Legal and Regulatory Framework: Denmark (OECD Publishing, 2012) at 61. 
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Appendix 5: Cases in the TRA, High Court, Court of Appeal, and Supreme Court.* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* Courts of New Zealand, the Ministry of Justice, and the Inland Revenue Department do not collect/publish 
statistics for the volume of tax cases before the Courts or the Taxation Review Authority. Data relating to the 
Taxation Review Authority is compiled from the cases reported in the New Zealand Tax Cases journal. Data 
relating to the general courts is compiled from the Ministry of Justice’s Judicial Decisions Online Database where 
cases have the Commissioner as a party. As a result, these statistics may also include cases that relate to ACC, 
liquidations, or child support, for instance.  
 
Year TRA High Court
Court of 
Appeal
Supreme 
Court
2008 13 64 9 4
2009 19 60 17 5
2010 11 65 11 6
2011 12 57 12 5
2012 11 56 8 7
2013 11 63 15 2
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